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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper details the share price reaction to dividend, earnings, and stock split 
announcements over a 37-year period. It first considers whether there is 
differential information content in similar corporate news announcements for 
different types of firms.   Second, it investigates whether the value of news 
information about these firms has declined over time (addressing the question 
of whether news has become “less newsworthy”).  We go on to study the 
relationship between stock price reactions to corporate news announcements 
and characteristics of the firms.  Operating under the assumption that news 
announcements have an asymmetrical impact on stock price according to 
factors like firm size, years of being publicly traded, or industry classification, 
we categorize firms by whether their corporate news announcements will be 
more or less valuable to the public.  For example, since the public may know 
more about larger firms, we expect the market to react less strongly (in 
absolute value) to new information from large firms. We find strong support 
for this hypothesis.  We find little evidence that is consistent with the idea that 
“news has become less newsworthy” over the past four decades.  However, 
although we do find that the share price reaction to “good” dividend news has 
become less positive and to “bad” dividend news has become less negative 
over time, no such related evidence exists for stock splits and earnings 
announcements. We also find an increase in standard deviation of three day 
returns around earnings and splits announcements over time, with noteworthy 
convergence amongst positive, negative and neutral earnings announcements. 
Additional investigation of entire distributions of returns using kernel density 
estimators also rejects the “news is no longer newsworthy” idea.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
Introduction 
Research on market efficiency with respect to economic events (e.g. CPI 
inflation rate changes, discount rate announcements, money stock reports), 
namely the work of Waud (1970), Castanias (1979), Schwert (1981), and  
Pearce (1983), has laid the foundation for a large literature examining the stock 
price reaction to corporate news announcements.1 It is accepted by both 
academics and practitioners that increased trading volume in public securities 
markets and changes in stock prices signal corporate information dissemination 
and investor processing.2  Although the absolute impact of news events (e.g. 
splits, dividends, and earnings) on market activity have been examined 
independently, this paper seeks to explore the variance of investor reaction to 
these news announcements over an extensive time series and address the 
discrepancy of ‘novelty’ of information content for announcements.3 To the 
latter point, not all announcements effectuate the same trading reactions, which 
may be partially attributed to industry or firm size.4  
                                                 
1
 See, as an example, Pearce and Roley ( 1985). Using survey data, the paper examines the 
daily response of stock prices to announcements about the money supply, inflation, real 
economic activity and the discount rate.  Survey data on market participants’ expectations of 
the announcements are used to identify the “unexpected” component of announcements to test 
the efficient markets hypothesis that only the “surprise” component moves stock price. 
Empirical results of the paper support this hypothesis and directionally indicate that surprises 
related to monetary policy substantially affect stock price. There is only weak evidence of 
stock price responses beyond the given announcement day. 
2
 Morse, 1981, Verrecchia, (1981) demonstrate that these are not sufficient to describe 
completely the dissemination of information and its interpretation by investors.  
3
 Beaver, 1968, investigated price changes and volume of trading during the trading week of 
annual earnings announcements with a focus on whether announcements had “information 
content” which was the impetus for investors to assess potential future returns on their 
investment. 
4
 It is noted by Chambers and Penman that there is much evidence (originally suggested in 
Beaver, 1968) that information is interpreted in the context of industry trends as well as other 
external influences may contribute to a lagged response of trading volume and price reaction. 
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Building on Hallock and Mashayekhi (2006), this paper controls for 
industry effects in addition to size quintile and cross-time characteristics.  
Using the extensive longitudinal information provided by I/B/E/S and CRSP, 
we collected information on individual companies including the earnings 
announcement amount, dividend announcement amount, split announcement 
factor, and corresponding announcement dates.  The industry characteristics 
delineated by Compustat allow us to control for endogenous factors that may 
affect excess cumulative returns. These characteristics, including measures of 
revenue (e.g. earnings from operations) and market cap, are particularly 
important over the time-series as we seek to address as many covariates that 
may be correlated with the error term as possible given available data. In 
essence, by addressing industry differences amongst the companies, we can 
attribute excess cumulative return movement to the event of interest and siphon 
out as much “additional noise” as possible.           
A few points on our interest in industry vectors are in order. While 
literature surrounding the impact of firm size on trading activity is largely 
uncontested by academics (as larger firms receive more coverage by both the 
media and banking analysts)5, considering industry and their respective 
influence on stock performance is a more nuanced task, as many 
socioeconomic forces and indirect correlations between firms of peripheral 
sectors must be considered. Furthermore, weight may be attributed to the party 
holding political power and the consolidation (or deconsolidation) of industries 
and the consequential movement of assets and capital to and from domestic 
companies.  Take for example, the banking industry. In the early 1970s, there 
                                                 
5
 For example, Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) explore stock momentum as a function of analyst 
coverage and firm size  
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were just over 43,000 banks in the U.S.  In 1990, there were approximately 
12,000.  Today, there are just over 8,000 domestic banks.6  The movement of 
assets to the largest banks amplifies this trend of institutional consolidation.  
Indeed, the percent of assets in each of the top 10 banks account for nearly 
67% of assets invested in all banks.  Compare this to 1970, when the top 10 
banks only represented 23% of invested assets.7  This consolidation both 
directly and indirectly influences the competitive landscape of the industry and 
similarly impacts the effect of announcements on competitors.8 As the 
phenomenon of consolidation continues in other industries (insurance, discount 
retailers), the importance of attributing the correct weight to industry 
considerations is amplified.9   
Data Sources and Description 
Five different data sources are employed in this work.  First, data on 
job loss announcements are used from the motivating work of Hallock and 
Farber (2009); second, data on earnings announcements from the Institutional 
Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) are used; third, data on dividend 
announcements collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) at the University of Chicago are used; finally, data on stock splits are 
                                                 
6
 Domestic bank refers to any bank regulated by U.S. banking authority regardless of central 
headquarters. 
7
 Thompson Financial, 08-June-09 
8
 In the opposite light, take the radio industry as an example of deconsolidation.  In the 1970s 
and 1980s at the local level, no radio provider could have more than 2 AM and 2 FM stations 
in their ownership.  In the early 1990s, this number rose to 8 AM and 8 FM stations. 
9
 As discussed in the final section (Summary, Concluding Comments, and Suggestions for 
Future Work), researching the situations surrounding individual companies and their strategic 
initiatives around announcement dates in the context of competitor’s announcements or 
complementary company announcements is good ground for future work and would require 
creating a database of contextually-rich data on all corporate announcements. In the instant 
paper we did not factor in considerations of political party  
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compiled from CRSP. Information on firm stock returns and market returns are 
similarly collected from CRSP and COMPUSTAT.10   
 Whether or not an earnings announcement coincides with a large 
“shock” is largely attributed to the forecasts of analysts who have greater 
access to the financial status of companies via investment houses than the 
general public.  Thus, the movement of stock price over time is largely related 
to analyst expectations, which form baseline expectations from which the 
public compares corporate outcomes (via announcement). We accordingly 
matched earnings announcements by date and most recent analyst forecast 
estimate to determine whether announcements met, exceeded or fell below 
expectations. The cumulative excess returns which reflected any additional 
“stock shock” were then considered in a three-day window of time, detailing 
market reaction to any given news event to address the plausible early 
dissemination of information to the public.  The main subject of interest is 
whether the standard deviation of excess cumulative returns in the window 
surrounding the announcements has trended towards or away from zero over 
time.  Applying the same idea to splits and dividends, we study the impact of 
announcements over time.  In the case of splits, the “baseline” of comparison is 
rather undefined (as splits have no direct economic impact on valuation 
metrics) while in the case of dividends news events pertain to meeting, beating 
or exceeding prior dividend payments is used as baseline precedent. We 
employed a time key that takes into account only days that the market is open 
as to avoid inappropriately suggesting that trading activity dealt with the news 
event rather than the market being open or not. 
                                                 
10
 In compiling split and dividend information, we merged CRSP and I/B/E/S data around 
specific announcement days by creating a “iclink” table, sorting and scoring CUSIP – 
PERMNO matches for each company.   
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Layoff Announcements 
The layoff announcement data come from an archival data source 
compiled by Farber and Hallock (2009) and extended by Hallock (2009).11  
First, the sample frame was identified as all firms in the Fortune 500 in any 
year from 1970 – 2007, inclusive.  The Wall Street Journal Index was then 
employed to garner information on all layoff announcements in each of the 
firms in question in each of the 38 years.  The index is published annually and 
contains a listing of abstracts by firm name of each article in the Wall Street 
Journal.12  After this process was completed, a total of 5,353 announced 
layoffs were recorded.  In another step, each actual article (not just the 
abstracts) was then carefully read so that additional information (e.g. number 
of workers in announced layoff) could be collected for more of the layoffs in 
the sample.  The frequency of the number of job loss announcements for the 
firms in the sample is plotted against the U.S. civilian unemployment rate in 
Figure 1.  The number of job loss announcements by time in the sample largely 
mirrors the business cycle. For example, in 1975 there were approximately 280 
layoff announcements, with a 8.2% unemployment rate, and in 2002 there 
were approximately 150 layoff announcements with a corresponding 5.8% 
unemployment rate. (See Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 See Farber and Hallock (2009), pg 3-4, and Hallock (2009) for more details on these data. 
12
 Paper (rather than the digital) copies of the index were used. 
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Figure 1. Number of Layoff Announcements and Unemployment Rate, by 
Year 
 
 
  
 
Source: For the data on the frequency of all job loss announcements by year, 
the sample frame is all firms that were ever in the Fortune 500 between 1970 
and 2007, inclusive.  Paper copies of the Wall Street Journal Index were used 
to seek information on all layoff announcements by each of these firms in each 
year.  The Index is published annually and contains a listing of abstracts by 
firm name of each article in the Wall Street Journal.  After this process was 
completed, a total of 5,353 announced layoffs were recorded in 791 different 
firms.  In an additional step, each full-length article was then carefully read so 
that we could be sure these were actual layoff announcements.  For more detail 
on the data see Farber and Hallock (2004) and Hallock (2009).  Data on the 
annual unemployment rate (civilian unemployment rate) were collected from 
the Economic Report of the President (2009). 
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Earnings Announcements 
Earnings announcement data are collected from the Institutional 
Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S).  These data include information on 
announced earnings per share for every publicly traded U.S. firm of interest.  
I/B/E/S data, unlike CRSP and Wall Street Journal data, are only available for 
the years 1974 – 2007.  The timeframe of 1970 – 1973 is thus omitted from our 
earnings analysis.  Unlike dividend announcements and stock splits, firms must 
report earnings in a systematic way. The distribution of the number of earnings 
announcements in the sample is plotted in Figure 2A.  
We also matched the actual earnings announcement with additional 
data in I/B/E/S on the most recent analyst forecast of earnings for the firm of 
interest13. We then categorized the earnings news as “good,” “bad,” or 
“neutral”.  Using the date of observation provided in the analyst earnings 
forecast file and the actual announcement date, we merged the most recent 
analyst estimates according to CUSIP identifier.  News is considered “good” if 
the actual announcement of earnings is higher than the forecast of the most 
recent analyst; it is considered “neutral” if the actual announcement exactly 
meets the most recent analyst forecast; and it is categorized as “bad” if the 
most recent forecast of earnings is higher than the actual announcement of 
earnings. In aggregate, we have 454,430 matched earnings announcements 
with performance against the most recent forecast of earnings for any given 
company.  Because of the enormity of the sample, we used a random 1/20 
sample for the calculation of excess cumulative returns (see Table I). Although 
our sample size correspondingly decreases with the selection criteria, the 
sample is still relatively large.  
                                                 
13
 The additional specifications narrowed the sample timeframe to 1987-2007.  
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Interestingly, the frequency of “bad” news has become more common 
since 1990, while “good” news has become increasingly less common.14  As 
seen in Figure 2B, “neutral” earnings news is substantially less common than 
either “good” or “bad” earnings news.  
 
Figure 2A. Frequency of Earnings Announcements   
 
 
 
Notes: Data are collected from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S).  These include information on announced earnings per share for 
every firm in the sample.  We have 454,430 observations on earnings 
announcements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Although one may hypothesize that economic vectors largely explain the noted trend in good 
announcements versus bad announcements, one must not discount the importance that 
increasing the transparency of publicly traded companies has had on general knowledge of 
their financial conditions (and income status).  
Earnings 
Announcements 
Frequency of Earnings Announcements 
Year 
Civilian 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 Earnings Announcements  Civilian Unemployment Rate 
1970 1980 1990 2000 
0 
15000 
30000 
45000 
60000 
 4% 
10% 
2010 
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Figure 2B. Fraction of Earnings Announcements by Type 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data are collected from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S).  These include information on announced earnings per share for 
every firm in the sample.  We have 454,430 observations on earnings 
announcements.  We were able to match the announcements with additional 
data in I/B/E/S on the most recent analyst forecast of earnings for the firm in 
question.  News is considered “good” if the actual announcement of earnings is 
higher than the most recent analyst forecast.  News is considered “neutral” if 
the actual announcement is exactly the same as the most recent analyst 
forecast.  News is considered “bad” if the most recent forecast is higher than 
the actual announcement. 
 
Dividend Announcements 
The data on dividend announcements come from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.  We selected 
dividends announcements from among eight categories of ordinary US cash 
dividends.15  Of the multiple dates associated with dividends (report date, 
record date, declaration date, distribution date), we use the declaration date as 
the date of the event.  To check the accuracy of the declaration date, the 8-K 
                                                 
15 These eight categories correspond with codes 1232, 1242, 1248, 1252, 1258, 1272, 1278, 
and 1292. We were not interested in foreign owned companies, stock option distributions and 
other non-cash tender exchanges, which pick up noise from other corporate initiatives like 
spin-merges, spin-IPOs or split-offs.  
Fraction of Earnings Announcements by Type 
Yea
r 
 Good Earnings 
News 
 Neutral Earnings 
News 
197
0 
198
0 
199
0 
200
0 
0 
.
2 
.
4 
.
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201
0 
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public press releases of a random set of companies detailed in the data were 
collected from the SEC website and compared to the dates on CRSP record.16   
Observations that had a missing announcement date were dropped. Our data 
include 364,270 dividends announcements from 1970-2007. Figure 3A details 
the frequency distribution of the number of dividend announcements for each 
year of interest.17  As noted in Hallock and Mashayekhi (2006), there was a 
notable increase in the number of dividend announcements through the 1970s.  
This was followed by a significant decline until the mid 1980s.  2007 had the 
largest number of dividend announcements relative to any single prior year, 
but generally the number of announcements has been stable since the late 
1980s. 
Next, we separated announced cash dividend payments into three 
different categories based on the type of news: “good,” “bad,” and “neutral”.  
A dividend announcement is defined as “bad” if the firm’s announced cash 
dividend amount is less than the firm’s previous cash dividend payment.  It is 
considered a “good” announcement if the announced cash dividend payment is 
more than the previous cash dividend payment.  Finally, a dividend payment is 
considered “neutral” if the announced cash dividend is equal to the previous 
cash dividend payment.  The fraction of dividends that can be categorized into 
the different types for our 38 years of data is summarized in Figure 3B.  
Although there is variability in the data, it is most likely that dividends fall into 
the “neutral” category at around 70% of the time, the fraction categorized as 
                                                 
16
 Of the 50 companies checked, 48 companies matched exactly to the CRSP data. The two 
that did not match perfectly were within a trading day of the CRSP declaration date. This 
discrepancy may be due to the timing of the release. 
17 We also plot the civilian unemployment rate as a benchmark for other economy-wide 
variables in Figure 1.  
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“good” is about 20% and as bad is generally less than 10% for any given year 
of interest. 
 
Figure 3A. Frequency of Dividend Announcement 
 
Notes: Data on dividend announcements are collected from the Center for 
Research in Security prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.  Dividend 
announcements were collected from eight categories of U.S. cash dividends: 
1232, 1242, 1248, 1252, 1258, 1272, 1278, and 1292.  Observations with 
missing announcement dates were dropped.  The data include dividend 
announcements from 1970 – 2007.  Data on the annual unemployment rate 
(civilian unemployment rate) were collected from the Economic Report of the 
President (2009). 
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Figure 3B. Fraction of Dividend Announcements by Type 
 
 
 
Notes:   Data on dividend announcements are collected from the Center for 
Research in Security prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.  Dividend 
announcements were collected from eight categories of U.S. cash dividends: 
1232, 1242, 1248, 1252, 1258, 1272, 1278, and 1292.  Observations with 
missing announcement dates were dropped.  The data include 297,554 
dividend announcements from 1970 – 2007.  A dividend announcement is 
considered “bad” news if the firm’s announced cash dividend amount is less 
than the firm’s previous cash dividend payment.  It is considered “good” news 
if the announced cash dividend payment is more than the previous cash 
dividend payment.  A dividend payment is considered “neutral” if the 
announced cash dividend is equal to the previous cash dividend payment. 
 
Stock Splits 
The stock split data are also collected from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.  Our data include 43,529 
stock split announcements.18 From Figure 4A it is evident that splits generally 
become more common throughout the 1970s to the late 1980s.  Then after a 
short period of decline into the early 1990s, they increased again throughout 
                                                 
18
 Stock splits are coded with a 5 in the first digit of the 4-digit identifying code.  
Fraction of Dividend Announcements by Type 
Year 
 Good Dividend News 
 Bad Dividend News 
 Neutral Dividend News 
1970 1980 1990 2000 
.1 
.2 
.3 
.4 
.5 
.6 
.7 
.8 
.9 
2010 
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the rest of that decade. From 2000 to 2007 the number of splits issued by firms 
has increased steadily, with a significant surge in 2006.  
For purposes of understanding the types of splits issued by firms (and 
to therefore attempt to address any differential information conveyed through 
splits across time), we delineated stock splits into one of three categories.  The 
first category is “2 for 1” stock splits.  As seen in Figure 4B, this is a relatively 
rare type (just over 10%) in the early 1970s and has grown steadily over the 
past three decades to be the most common of the categories in the year 2007 at 
just over 95%.  The second category is “less than 2 for 1” splits.  This was the 
most common category in the early 1970s (at around 80%) but has declined 
steady over the past three decades and, as of 2007 is just around 1%.19  The 
final category is “greater than 2 for 1” splits.  These are quite rare and have 
hovered under 5% over the entire period of the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Splits that are less than 1:1 are referred to as reverse splits.  This form of splits is indicative 
of poor past performance.  Stocks below a $5 mark cannot be marginalized so a firm seeking 
institutional investor tender may employ a reverse split to target a higher per-share price. 
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Figure 4A. Frequency of Stock Splits by Year 
 
 
 
Notes: Data on stock splits are collected from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.  Our data include 43,259 
stock split announcements.  Data on the annual unemployment rate (civilian 
unemployment rate) were collected from the Economic Report of the President 
(2009). 
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Figure 4B. Fraction of Split Announcements by Type 
 
 
 
Notes: Data on stock splits are collected from the Center for Research on 
Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.  Our data include 43,259 
stock split announcements.  Stock splits are grouped into one of three 
categories: “2 for 1” splits, less than “2 for 1” splits, and greater than “2 for 1” 
splits 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
STOCK MARKET REACTION TO  CORPORATE FINANCIAL NEWS 
 
Motivating Example: Share Price Reaction to Job Loss Announcements  
Farber and Hallock (2009) and Hallock (2009) investigate the 
relationship between job loss announcements and stock prices.  This serve as a 
motivation for our work.  Through their analysis, they find that the share price 
reaction has become less negative over time.  The share price reaction 
averaged –0.283 percent (and significantly negative) in the 1970s, -0.091 
percent in the 1980s, and +0.125 percent (but not significantly different from 
zero) in the 1990s.  They also document a steady decline in the negative share 
price reaction of job loss announcements over the period of 1970-2000.  A 
summary of their results is displayed in Figure 5.  In this figure the cumulative 
average excess return for each year from 1970 – 1999 are plotted on the graph 
for the “3 day window” representing days –1, 0, and +1.    
Farber and Hallock (2009) employ a variety of robustness checks on 
this basic result.  They show that regardless of whether the cumulative median 
excess returns or the fraction negative is used, the same basic result of a 
gradual decline (in absolute value) in the share price reaction over time is 
found.  Furthermore, using varying “window” widths has little discernable 
effect on the results.  That is, if the window widths of one day (day 0) or 11 
days (day –5 though day +5) are used, the same basic results hold.  It is also 
clear from Figure 5 that this less negative share price over time also holds 
when layoffs are not contaminated by other corporate news announcements.20 
                                                 
20
 Clear of dividend announcements means that layoff announcements in the sample do not 
occur within ten days of a dividend (earnings) announcement in the same firm.  Clear of recent 
layoffs means that the layoff announcement is at least 100 days after any other layoff 
announcement in the same firm. 
   9. 
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One possible reason for this gradual decline toward zero is that news is no 
longer newsworthy.  This contention suggests that there is less news content in 
announcements released more recently so share prices react less powerfully 
than they did in the 1970s.21 Farber and Hallock (2009) reject this hypothesis 
in their work on job loss and instead turn to the relative importance of reasons 
for layoff announcements (namely demand deficiency and efficiency 
reasons).22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Hallock and Mashayekhi (2006) 
22
 See Hallock (2009) 
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Figure 5.  Share Price Reaction to Job Loss Announcements: Mean Cumulative 
Excess Returns, 3 Day Window 
 
 
Notes: All announcement information from Hallock 2009, using announcement 
information from the Wall Street Journal and data stock price data from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). “All announcements” refers to 
the 3 day cumulative excess return to the job loss announcements by year.  The 
cumulative excess returns were calculated by regressing the firm daily stock 
return, Rit, on the value-weighted average market return, Rmt.  The regression 
itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is estimated around s = 0, the event date.  Abnormal returns are 
computed as follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal returns 
are then calculated by adding up the returns for the three days around the 
announcement and then averaging over all firms within each year.   Clear of 
dividend (earnings) announcements means that the layoffs in the sub-sample 
do not occur within ten days of a dividend (earnings) announcement.  Clear of 
recent layoffs means that the layoffs in the sub-sample are at least 100 days 
after any other layoff announcement by the same firm.  Various changes to this 
selection criteria do not have meaningful effects on the results.  
 
 General Announcement Reaction 
To better understand the impact of announcements on trading activity, a 
window of time (inclusive of the actual event) must be considered, as Morse 
(1978) argued: “trading prior to a public announcement may occur because of 
differences in beliefs about the probability of different signals being emitted by 
the public announcement. These differences in beliefs may be caused by the 
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asymmetric distribution of the information before its public announcement. 
Trading volume following the public announcement may be due to different 
interpretations of the signal released and/or investors returning to diversified 
positions after taking speculative positions prior to the public announcement. 
Significant price changes surrounding public announcements may occur when 
some nonzero subset of investors receives a signal that changes their beliefs. 
Therefore, price changes prior to the public announcement may indicate that 
the signal or some clue about it had been received by a subset of the 
population.' A price change immediately following the public announcement 
indicates some consensus change in beliefs caused by the signal.”23 As such, 
we have constructed an absolute return window around the event(s) of interest 
according to the trading calendar.24  
Although research suggests different extents to which internal and 
external variables contribute to estimated abnormal returns around 
announcement times, it has been widely accepted that the reaction time of 
investors is lagged in response to corporate economic events.25  This lag may 
be attributed to an information-processing period wherein there is an 
                                                 
23
 Morse (1981) p. 760 
24
 Furthermore, it has been contended that the very timing of corporate disclosures signals the 
directionally positive or negative nature of news. As Patell and Wolfson (1982) examine firm 
behavior in respect to systematic intraday timing of earnings and dividend announcements, 
testing the hypothesis that good news is more likely to be released at the open of markets while 
bad news appears after the close of trading more frequently. Endogenous and exogenous 
variables like stock price change and comparison to the preceding period’s earnings or 
dividends respectively are used to distinguish good news from bad and information content 
analysis predicated on daily stock price data is manipulated to show how differences in 
disclosure timing impact inferences about the magnitude of security price response and the 
speed of price adjustment from announcement (time zero).  
25
 Ball and Brown (1968), Jot, Litzenberger and McEnally (1977), Watts (1978), Rendleman, 
Jones and Latane (1982), Foster, Olsen and Shelvin (1984), Bernard and Thomas (1990) Chan 
(2003), Daniel (1998), Barberis (1998), Hong and Stein (1999), suggest that investors rely on 
the past representativeness heuristic, conservatism, and ignorance of news (and overreaction to 
prices) which results in initial underreaction to announcements followed by overreaction (or 
lagged reaction). 
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“unbiased” reaction on the day of the announcement, but investor trading 
activity fluctuates in the subsequent days26 as the implications of 
announcements are more fully felt over time.27 
Furthermore, wealth and risk preferences may effectuate different 
magnitudes and timing of investor responses.28 This factor is influential in 
appropriately contributing market responses (in trading volume and general 
activity) in some part to factors unassociated with an announcement. As an 
example, an institutional or private investor may have a change in investment 
mandate or capital needs that are entirely unrelated to announcements but may 
occur serendipitously around the event time. This may be argued to be support 
for omitted variable bias contentions in our sample output. 
Earnings 
In compliance with SEC mandates, publicly traded companies 
announce earnings on a regular basis (although their calendar years may vary).  
Publicly traded U.S. companies also must post quarterly earnings 
announcements for the purpose of keeping shareholders abreast of the 
businesses’ financial status. As Fama (1991) detailed, in an inefficient market, 
the share price of any given firm may fail to reflect all information pertaining 
to its operations, and abnormal returns/ arbitrage may be garnered by 
capitalizing on the time lag between the announcement and the incorporation 
of information into volume and direction of trading. Regardless, the disclosure 
                                                 
26
 This is suggested by Morse(2002) 
27It is important to address the plausibility that “excess volatility” in prices (e.g. when stock 
prices demonstrate large movements not associated with a news announcement) may be due to 
price movements unrelated to news announcements. Chan (2003)   
28
 The issue of whether firm-specific information can be isolated to some extent from market 
factors, both informational and non-informational in nature, may be mitigated with 
econometric technique and empirical methods. Assuming price changes and trading volume 
related to firm-specific information can be isolated to some degree, we can then consider 
interpretations of the results.  
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of earnings information effectuates - both directly and indirectly- the volatility 
of stock price, as earnings are an integral part of the value of any given firm.  
Because we use data from the 1970s to present day, it is necessary to 
note the change in accounting standards and earnings announcement reliability 
with the passage of legislation like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, commonly 
referred to as SOX.29 (In essence, if the quality and consequential information 
content of announcements improved sizably with such legislation, investor 
information processing and market responsiveness would hypothetically 
decrease as independent investor due-diligence would not be as influential in 
uncovering “new” or “correct” financial statements.) Cohen, Dey and Lys 
(2005) document that the informativeness of earnings increased steadily over 
time, and that there was no significant change in earnings informativeness 
following the passage of SOX. Further, Cohen et al. find that earnings 
management increased the absolute informativeness of earnings, but reduced 
the informativeness for a given earnings surprise, as well as reduced the 
abnormal return for a given amount of earnings surprise.30  In totality, this 
research signals that for poor performing firms, SOX was decipherably 
                                                 
29The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (p.107-204, 116 Stat. 745, enacted July 30, 2002) set new 
or enhanced standards for all U.S. public company boards, management and public accounting 
firms. It does not apply to privately held companies. The act contains 11 titles, or sections, 
ranging from additional corporate board responsibilities to criminal penalties, and requires the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to implement rulings on requirements to comply 
with the new law. Harvey Pitt, the 26th chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), led the SEC in the adoption of dozens of rules to implement the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Please see sec.gov for further details. 
30
 Cohen, Daniel, Dey, Lys (2005). The authors found an increase in earnings management 
preceding SOX was primarily in poorly performing industries.  By examining the fraction of 
managerial compensation derived from options, the authors find evidence that supports the 
hypothesis that the opportunistic behavior of managers, primarily related to the fraction of 
compensation derived from options, was significantly associated with earnings management in 
the period preceding SOX. Because misrepresented information may have inflated stock price 
beyond a point reflective of actual earnings, the re-normalizing of price according to other 
industry (rather than firm) specific news lends weight in explaining a lag in trading volume 
and general price prior to SOX. 
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influential in increasing transparency of their economic status, allowing the 
market to appropriately adjust (downwards in valuation), while stronger 
performing firms showed little qualitative change in earnings informativeness 
after the passage of SOX, resulting in little change in market valuation of their 
stock.   
Legislative issues aside, many studies (including those of Ball and 
Brown (1968), Joy, Litzenberger, McEnally, Watts (1978, 1979); Rendleman, 
Jones, Latane (1982); Foster, Olsen, Shevlin (1984); and Bernard and Thomas 
(1990)) have estimated that abnormal returns are largely predicated on 
previously-announced earnings. According to anticipation surrounding the 
announcement, earnings announcements which exceed analyst and investor 
anticipation tend to effectuate positive trends in price per share, while falling 
below expectations tends to have the opposite effect, although not necessarily 
identical in magnitude. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that return variances 
and betas, and therefore expected returns, increase during earnings 
announcement periods (Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1979); Epstein and 
Turnbull (1980); Choi and Salamon (1989)). Previous research has 
demonstrated anomalous positive abnormal returns during earnings 
announcements (Chambers and Penman 1984; Penman 1984, 1987; Chari et al. 
1988).31 Ball and Kothari (1991) reported that abnormal returns remain after 
controlling for risk increases at earnings announcements. The abnormal returns 
are not related to any over or under-reaction by the market to earnings news 
                                                 
31
 Because risk was not allowed to vary in event time in this research, it does not adequately 
distinguish between increased expected returns and true abnormal returns. 
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(DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987); Bernard and Thomas (1989)) because the 
authors do not condition on the earnings realization.32 
To suggest that a lag in stock price reaction to earnings news is solely 
the product of wealth and risk preferences or the time delay in the 
dissemination information to the market is an oversimplification.  Securities 
analysts’ reaction to recent and historical earnings and the consequential 
“earnings forecast error” also influences stock price behavior.  Abarbanell and 
Bernard (1992) present evidence that analysts’ forecasts underreact to recent 
earnings announcements, which is consistent with the “naïve seasonal random 
walk forecast” which Bernard and Thomas (1990) explain underscore the 
anomalous post-earnings-announcement drift.33  They find that analysts’ 
behavior is a partial explanation for stock price underreaction to earnings 
announcements and may be unrelated to overreactions of stock price.34 In 
addition to these works, DeBondt and Thaler (1990) and Mendenhall (1991) 
                                                 
32
 A battery of work including Rendleman, Jones and Latane (1987); Freeman and Tse (1989), 
Bernard and Thomas (1989) have identified that when controlling for quarter “t+1” earnings, 
over half of the “drift” associated with the quarter “t” earnings is eradicated.32 As Bernard and 
Thomas (1990) detail, stock prices do not reflect the entire implications of current earnings on 
future earnings,32 and the signs and magnitudes of the three-day reactions are auto-correlated 
with the structure of earnings, “as if stock prices fail to reflect the extent to which each firm’s 
earnings series differs from a seasonal random walk”.32 Bernard and Thomas (1989) and 
Freeman and Tse (1989) both find that there is a lagged reaction to quarterly earnings 
announcements somewhat systematically.  Given that a firm announces positive unexpected 
earnings “for quarter t, the market tends to be positively surprised in the days surrounding for 
the announcement for quarter t+1.” This is consistent with the market failing to properly revise 
expectations for quarter t+1 earnings upon receipt of the news in quarter t. (Also see Bernard 
and Thomas (1990), pg 27).  
33
 The underreactions in analysts’ forecasts are at most only about half as large as necessary to 
explain the magnitude of the drift.  
34
 They also find that the forecasts examined by DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) and Chopra, 
Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992) which were deemed “extreme” cannot be viewed as 
overreactions to earnings and are not clearly linked to stock price overreaction. Tests of 
Analysts’ Overreaction/ Underreaction to Earnings Information as an Explanation for 
Anomalous Stock Price Behavior, Abarbanell and Bernard, The Journal of Finance, Volume 
XLVII, No. 3, July 1992 
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explore evidence of inefficient analysts’ forecasts which may point to over-
reliance of investors on analysts to explain anomalous stock price behavior.35 
Further, the impact of an earnings announcement on stock price and 
trading activity is related to more than simply the earning figures reported: it is 
also a product of the signal effectuated through announcement timing. As Ball 
and Kothari (1991) contend: 
 
“. . . the timing of an earnings announcement is informative because 
managers systematically announce good news early and bad news late 
(Givoly and Palmon (1982); Chambers and Penman (1984); Kross and 
Schroeder (1984)). This timing theory predicts that average abnormal 
returns: (1) are positive at the earnings announcement, (2) are negative 
prior to the announcement, and (3) cumulate to zero by the end of the 
announcement period. Cross-sectional variation in announcement-
period risks and returns is a function of firm size, which is a proxy for 
the increase in information arrival during earnings announcement 
periods. The evidence reveals that, after controlling for risk increases, 
abnormal returns generally are positive and decreasing in firm size.”36  
 
This anomaly, in application to the functional fixation hypothesis, has been 
instrumental in furthering the study of earnings announcement impact on stock 
price when employed in the context of sorting investors into “sophisticated” 
and “unsophisticated” categories.37 Although we do not seek to explicitly 
                                                 
35
 Other notable works and a literary review of analyst forecasts and stock price include 
Schipper (1991); Ali, Klein and Rosenfeld (1992); Lys and Sohn (1990), Klein (1990), 
Abarbanell (1991) [The latter three explore analyst underreaction to prior period stock price 
behavior.]  
36
 For the smallest size firms, abnormal returns in the ten days up to and including the earnings 
announcement are approximately 1.75 percent in the average quarter, or approximately 7 
percent over only 40 trading days per year.( Swaminathan, 2000)  
37
 Hand (1990) investigated quarterly earnings that included previously announced book gains 
from debt-equity swaps. “He distinguished between "sophisticated" and "unsophisticated" 
investors, hypothesizing that only the former correctly comprehend the different implications 
of swap gains and other components of earnings. He found that abnormal returns increase in a 
variable representing the interaction between the swap gain and a proxy for the probability that 
the marginal investor is unsophisticated. are skeptical about both the hypothesis and whether it 
predicts the observed result. Hand's result is as similar to the puzzling but typical size effect 
around earnings announcements. It seems unlikely to be due to swap gains, to the sign or 
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delineate sophisticated investors from their counterparts, these vectors 
certainly contribute to differences in reaction magnitude we observe in the 
post-announcement period for large and small firms. 38  Moreover, there are 
some forms of risk and error miscalculation which have been unanimously 
contended to impact all investors, mainly because of the attribution of error to 
analysts who forecast future earnings metrics. 39 
Even after considering analyst earnings forecast error, timing issues, 
and over-weighting of previous events to predict future earnings (or similar 
valuation metrics), there is still a remaining reaction drift. To this point, Tarun 
and Lakshimanan (2005) explore the cross-sectional implications of the 
inflation illusion hypothesis for the post-earnings-announcement drift. The 
inflation illusion hypothesis suggests that generally, stock market investors fail 
to incorporate inflation in forecasting future earnings growth rates, which 
makes firms with earnings growths positively correlated to inflation to be 
undervalued, visa verse. The authors show that the sensitivity of earnings 
growth to inflation varies monotonically across stocks sorted on standardized 
unexpected earnings and, consistent with the inflation illusion hypothesis, 
                                                                                                                                
magnitude of earnings information released at the time, to errors in measuring the earnings 
information released, or to functional fixation.” Ball and Kathori (1991) 
38
  Sloan (1997) explains “some textbooks recommend that analysts examine accrual and cash-
flow components of current earnings when predicting future earnings. Prior research, however, 
shows no systematic stock price response to the release of information about cash-flow and 
accrual components of earnings and also no difference in the information content of these two 
components.” Sloan finds that the extent to which the performance of current earnings persists 
into the future depends on the relative magnitudes of the cash-flow and accrual components of 
earnings.  
39
 Chambers and Penman (1984) provide evidence on the relationship between timeliness of 
earnings reports and stock price behavior surrounding their release.  Beaver (1968, 1971) 
documents that the variability of stock returns at the time of announcements of firms’ annual 
and interim earnings differ from nonannouncement periods, directionally indicative that more 
information arrives to the market in periods when earnings reports are released than other 
periods.  Also, evidence provided by Ball and Brown (1968) and Brown and Kennelly (1972) 
show that information (e.g. accounting)  which are indicative of earnings levels may be 
correlated to a reporting lag.  The longer the reporting lag, the more information may be 
disseminated through other news sources.  
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show that lagged inflation predicts future earnings growth, abnormal returns, 
and earnings announcement returns of standardized unexpected earnings-sorted 
stocks. The reaction magnitude is suggested to be larger for smaller firms than 
larger firms in our data.  
In sum, the noted phenomenon of a post-earnings announcement drift is 
largely attributable to a delayed price response to information provided 
through earnings announcements.  In this paper, we offer directionally 
suggestive output that price lags occur for corporate announcement, although 
those price lags trend towards complete “day zero” reaction.40 
 Dividends 
Accounting principles which require stock dividend distributions to be 
coupled by a decline in the firm’s retained earnings support the argument that 
distributions will only be made when managers do not anticipate the balance of 
retained earnings to constrict future dividend payments.41 The information 
content of the dividends hypothesis asserts that managers use cash dividend 
announcements to signal changes in their expectations about future prospects 
of the firm. As mentioned by Pettit (1972) there are several reasons to believe 
that new and significant information is conveyed by dividend announcements: 
“First, managers are to some extent restricted as to the kind of public 
                                                 
40
 The reaction magnitude is suggested to be larger for smaller firms than larger firms in our 
data 
41
 The implications of a stock split or dividend signal more information about firms than 
simply their recent earnings performance. Firms declaring stock distributions of 25 percent or 
greater account for them as stock splits, which have no impact on retained earnings. However, 
distributions of less than 25 percent, which are accounted for as stock dividends and reduce the 
retained earnings of the company, have been objectively determined to signal managerial 
confidence in the business to restore retained earnings with future revenues. “In effect, the 
signal has value because it is costly.” This is the retained earnings hypothesis. Peterson, Millar, 
Rimbey  
The authors formulated a test of the effect of accounting choice on legally defined distributable 
equity (for 1978-1990 data). The results of their test support the hypothesis that the choice of a 
stock distribution accounting method that reduces legally defined distributable equity conveys 
more information than one in which distributable equity is not reduced. 
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statements they can make regarding the future earnings generating ability of 
the firm. Second, due to random factors reported earnings may vary 
substantially from long run normalized earnings and market participants may 
be unable to distinguish these random effects. In light of this, the management 
may use dividend payments (or a lack of them) as a method of indicating their 
estimates of the firm’s earning power and liquidity.” Hence firms tend to 
increase their dividend payment when there is a high probability that cash 
flows in the future will be enough to support the higher rate of payment, and 
will decrease their dividend payment when they think that certain that cash 
flows are insufficient to support the present dividend rate. 42 
Accounting and financial economics research has sought to explain 
managers’ motivation for declaring large stock distributions and the choice of 
accounting method. Grinblatt et al. (1984) suggest that stock dividends signal 
greater future earnings expectations than stock splits.  Asquith et al. (1989) 
posit that stock splits signal the permanence of past earnings increases.  Either 
way, the choice of accounting entry impacts the number of shares outstanding 
and has economic implications.43 This information has important effects on 
trading volume and price reactions on ex-dividend dates. Overall, it has been 
found that an announcement of an increase in the dividend payment is 
associated with an increase in stock prices, while announcements reporting 
dividend payment reductions are associated with a decrease in stock prices 
(Pettit (1972); Charest (1978); Aharony and Swary (1980); Kwan (1981); 
Brickley (1983); Aharony and Dotan (1994); and Kaestner and Liu (1998)). 
 
                                                 
42
 Shiller (1981) concluded that stock prices are too volatile to be explained by dividend 
changes 
43
 Peterson, Millar, Rimbey (2001) 
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Stock Splits 
On average, stock splits are employed by firms that seek to return the 
stock price to a ‘normal’ range, usually after generous growth in earnings.  
Using fundamental operating performance as a source of the underreaction, 
Ikenberry and Ramnath (1991) find that splitting firms have “an unusually low 
propensity to experience a contraction in future earnings” and show a drift of 
9% the year following a split announcement, on average. The target price 
effectuated through a split is related to: 1) market-wide average price; 2) firm-
specific price; and 3) industry-wide average price.  Explicitly, the price 
adjustment allows investors with relatively finite means (as compared to 
institutional or high net worth investors) the ability to buy economically 
sizeable (“round”) quantities of stock. Simultaneously, institutional investors 
and high net worth individuals may save brokerage fees when securities are 
priced high because there is a fixed per-share transaction cost of buying and 
selling securities. Thus, a balance between these classes of investors is 
determined by the company of interest, according to their specific corporate 
mandates.  The somewhat puzzling fact is that splits do not alter the inherent 
market value of the firm (they simply result in more shares being issued), yet 
they persistently and statistically significantly result in increased trading 
activity both at and after the split.44 The phenomenon of lagged reaction to 
announcements as discussed in relation to earnings also is seen in response to 
splits.  
Practitioners and academics alike have advanced theories to explain 
persistence of price reactions associated with splits.  Two of the most popular 
theories are (1) optimal price and (2) signaling.  The optimal pricing theory 
                                                 
44
 Ikenberry, Ramnath (2000)  
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suggests that firms interested in retaining a heterogeneous and broad 
stockholder base may adjust stock price by splitting stock or distributing 
dividends. Baker and Gallagher (1989) found from a survey of managers’ 
motives for stock splits that nearly 99% of the respondents indicated that splits 
made it easier for small investors to purchase round lots, and nearly 94% 
believed that splits kept a firm’s stock price in an optimal range while 
increasing the number of stockholders.  Grinblatt et al. (1984) suggest a 
slightly different version of the “optimal price” hypothesis, contending that, 
“given the cost associated with splits and stock dividends, if managers possess 
unfavorable information about future growth, they may decide against 
increasing the number of shares even if they perceive the stock price to be “too 
high” because they anticipate that, when this information is disclosed, stock 
prices revert to the norm.”45 In a similar line of thought, Lev (1987) suggests 
that industry norms for stock prices as well as financial-ratio norms are used in 
determining whether a stock should be split or not. 
The signaling theory, on the other hand, suggests that given asymmetric 
information between mangers and investors, managers may attempt to convey 
favorable financial information to the market.  Ross (1990) and Leland and 
Pyle (1994) contend that in order for a signaling device to be valid, there must 
be a cost associated with sending incorrect signals. “Namely, it should be 
costly for firms with below-average expected performance to mimic the 
signaling decisions of those firms enjoying above-average performance.”  The 
negative consequences of incorrect signaling have not been deeply explored to 
                                                 
45
 Ikenberry, Ramnath (2000) 
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present day, but those studies that have focused on the subject have yielded 
unclear findings.46 
Peterson, Millar, Rimbey (1995) note that as Schwartz and Monahan 
(1986) point out, of 103 stock distributions greater than 25 percent in 1984, 
only 63 described their distribution as a stock split.  Because the CRSP data we 
employ in this work codes a stock distribution by the actual equity implications 
of the event, the fact that there may be inappropriate accounting of stock splits 
as stock dividends by corporate accounting choices is negligible in 
importance.47  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 It is interesting to note that Peterson, Millar, Rimbey (1995) showed [through the studies of 
Schwartz and Monahan (1986)] that of 103 stock distributions greater than 25 percent in 1984, 
only 63 described their distribution as a stock split.  Because the CRSP data we employ in this 
work codes a stock distribution by the actual equity implications of the event, the fact that 
there may be inappropriate accounting of stock splits as stock dividends by corporate 
accounting choices is negligible in importance.  
47
 Based on evidence that a large portion of stock splits in previous studies (e.g. Lakonishok 
and Lev (1987); Klein and Peterson (1989); McNichols), it is plausible that a major portion of 
the stock splits were actually accounted for as dividends, affecting the equity available for cash 
dividends. The aforementioned works focus on the positive or negative signaling corporate 
news announcements have on stock price.* 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
BASELINE EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
 
The simplest way to consider whether corporate news announcements 
have any effect on stock prices is to examine the prices prior to and directly 
after the announcements.  This comparison implicitly assumes that had the 
news event not been announced the stock prices after the news event would 
have been just equal to the prices before the announcement.  Because market 
and economic vectors may cloud the robustness of the results, we employ 
simple event study methods (Brown and Warner, (1985); Campbell, Lo, and 
MacKinlay, (1997); Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll, (1969); and MacKinlay, 
(1997)) that will help us to consider what would have happened to stock prices 
in the absence of the corporate news. 
In order to seek the stock price reaction to corporate news events, we 
will use the common event study method.  Excess returns, cumulative excess 
returns, cumulative average excess returns, and cumulative median excess 
returns are all described below.48  Let t index trading time in days, s indicate 
the day of the corporate news announcement, and i indicate firms.  First, the 
firm daily stock return, itR , is regressed on mtR , the weighted
49
 average market 
return for day t.  This regression 
 itmtiiit RR ηβα ++=                         (1)
is estimated for the period s-130 to day s-1050.  The least-squares estimated 
coefficients from this regression, iαˆ  and iβˆ , along with the actual values of 
                                                 
48
 As these yield very similar outcomes, we do not report each in the paper. 
49
 These were computed as both value-weighted and equally-weighted returns with little effect 
on the results.  We report results for value-weighted returns in the paper. 
50
 Various prediction periods such as s-255 to s-10 were tested with no meaningful effect on 
the results. 
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the weighted average stock returns on day t, mtR , allow us to construct the 
expected return on that day for each firm for each day, itRˆ , where 
 mtiiit RR βα ˆˆˆ += . (2) 
Using this information on how we expected the stock of firm i at date t to 
perform we can then construct the abnormal return for firm i on day t as 
 ititmtiiitit RRRRAR ˆˆˆ −=−−= βα  (3) 
itAR is known as the abnormal (or excess) return of stock i on day t.   
Intuitively, this abnormal return is the part of the movement in the stock return 
of firm i that is not correlated with overall movements in stock prices and 
therefore may reflect unexpected firm-specific factors. 
These abnormal returns are calculated for each firm’s corporate news 
event (e.g. dividend announcement, announcement of a stock split, earnings 
announcement) in the sample.  We also calculate cumulative excess returns for 
several days around (e.g. three days – day s-1 to day s+1) for each event.  In 
addition, we compute the average cumulative abnormal returns (across all 
events at date s for each event), the average cumulative abnormal return (over 
the three days across all events), and the median cumulative abnormal return.  
If the corporate news announcements have no systematic effect on stock 
returns, then the mean and median returns will not differ significantly from 
zero.  
The t-statistics used to compute whether the mean abnormal returns are 
different from zero are carefully described in Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 
(1997).  The tests are based on the idea that the returns should be equal to zero 
in the absence of any news that affects the value of the company in question.  
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The extent to which these returns differ from zero is evidence consistent with 
the idea that the corporate news events we examine are, in fact, news.51 
Earnings Result 
Earnings announcements are categorized into “good,” “neutral,” or 
“bad” news depending on whether the actual announcement of earnings 
exceeds, exactly meets, or falls short of the last recorded estimate by an analyst 
in the I/B/E/S data. 
Figure 6A highlights the cumulative average excess returns for “good,” 
“neutral,” and “bad” news announcements as well as for all announcements 
together for each of the 38 years of data from 1970-2007.  The average three 
day share price reaction to earnings announcements that we have categorized 
as “good” news is consistently positive in each of the years of the data.  
Similarly, earnings announcements categorized as “bad” news are universally 
associated with negative cumulative average excess returns in each of the 
detailed years.  Not surprisingly, earnings announcements categorized as 
“neutral” are associated with some slightly positive returns and some slightly 
negative returns.  In addition, there is evidence in Figure 6A that the share 
price reactions to “good” news have become less “good” (tending toward zero) 
and that the share price reactions to “bad” news are becoming less “bad” 
(tending toward zero) over time. 
In Figures 6B, 6C, 6D, and 6E we examine share price reactions to 
“good” news earnings announcements and “bad” new earnings announcements 
for firms in the top quintile in terms of size (in Figure 6B) and for firms in the 
bottom quintile in terms of size (in Figure 6C).  As shown in Figures 6D and 
6E, firms in the bottom quintile in terms of firm size have stronger share price 
                                                 
51
 Hallock and Mashayekhi, (2006) 
 34 
 
 
reactions (either larger positive for “good” news or larger negative for “bad” 
news) than firms in the top quintile of the size distribution.  Again, this is 
consistent with the idea that for the past decades, more is known about the 
larger firms so that any news is less surprising to the market.  However, there 
is no evidence to suggest that “news has become less newsworthy” over the 
decades in this sample. 
It is also worthwhile to consider trading volume around earnings 
announcements versus normal (in between announcement) trading volume 
delineated by quintile, as less liquidity characterizes small market-cap 
companies, and this lack of relative liquidity makes smaller announcements 
(either positive or negative) effectuate a larger impact on stock price for 
smaller companies than it does on stock of larger counterparts. In essence, the 
number of shares that move during earnings season far exceed the number that 
move out of earnings season, and it takes less investors moving their money to 
impact bid and ask levels for smaller companies than it does for larger 
companies. The impact of firm size on excess cumulative returns may be seen 
in Table 2, where the absolute value of the coefficient on the smaller sized 
firms is larger than the coefficient on larger firms (-0.342 versus -0.099). 
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Figure 6A. Share Price Reaction to Earnings Announcements: Mean 
Cumulative Excess Returns, 3 Day Window 
 
 
 
Notes: Data are collected from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S).  These include information on announced earnings per share for 
every firm in the sample.  We have 454,430 observations on earnings 
announcements.  The cumulative excess returns were calculated by regressing 
the firm daily stock return, Rit, on the value-weighted average market return, 
Rmt.  The regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is estimated around s = 0, the event date.  
We compute abnormal returns as follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day 
cumulative abnormal returns are then calculated by adding up the returns for 
the three days around the announcement and then averaging over all firms 
within each year.   
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Figure 6B.  Share Price Reaction to Earnings Announcements: Mean 
Cumulative Excess Returns, 3 Day Window, Firms in the Top Quintile 
by Firm Size 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data are collected from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S).  These include information on announced earnings per share for 
every firm in the sample.  We have 454,430 observations on earnings 
announcements.  “Top 20” refers to the top 20 percent of firms in the data in a 
given year by market value.  The cumulative excess returns were calculated by 
regressing the firm daily stock return, Rit, on the value-weighted average 
market return, Rmt.  The regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is estimated for a period s-
130 to s-10 where s = 0 is the event date.  We compute abnormal returns as 
follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal returns are then 
calculated by adding up the returns for the three days around the 
announcement and then averaging over all firms within each year.  “Bottom 
20” refers to the bottom 20 percent of firms in the data in a given year by 
market value. 
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Figure 6C. Share Price Reaction to Earnings Announcements: Mean 
Cumulative Excess Returns, 3 Day Window, Firms in the Bottom 
Quintile by Firm Size 
 
 
 
Notes: Data are collected from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S).  These include information on announced earnings per share for 
every firm in the sample.  We have 454,430 observations on earnings 
announcements.  “Top 20” refers to the top 20 percent of firms in the data in a 
given year by market value.  The cumulative excess returns were calculated by 
regressing the firm daily stock return, Rit, on the value-weighted average 
market return, Rmt.  The regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is estimated for a period s-
130 to s-10 where s = 0 is the event date.  We compute abnormal returns as 
follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal returns are then 
calculated by adding up the returns for the three days around the 
announcement and then averaging over all firms within each year.  “Bottom 
20” refers to the bottom 20 percent of firms in the data in a given year by 
market value. 
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Figure 6D. Share Price Reaction to Good Earnings Announcements: Mean 
Cumulative Excess Returns, 3 Day Window 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data are collected from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S).  These include information on announced earnings per share for 
every firm in the sample.  We have 454,430 observations on earnings 
announcements.  An announcement is considered “good” if actual earnings 
beat the most recent analyst forecast. 
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Figure 6E. Share Price Reaction to Bad Earnings Announcements: Mean 
Cumulative Excess Returns, 3 Day Window 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data are collected from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S).  These include information on announced earnings per share for 
every firm in the sample.  We have 454,430 observations on earnings 
announcements.  An announcement is considered “bad” if actual earnings were 
below the most recent analyst forecast. 
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Dividend Result: 
Figure 7A displays the cumulative average excess returns to dividend 
announcements for each year from 1970 through 2007, inclusive, using a three 
day event window (days –1, 0, and +1).  Varying the event window (e.g. one 
day, three days, eleven days) does not substantially affect the results.52 It is 
unsurprising that the line that represents “all” dividend categories has 
relatively little variance over the duration of our sample.  However, we have 
categorized the dividend news into “good,” “neutral,” and “bad” based on 
whether the firm announcement of dividends is better, the same as, or worse 
than the previous dividends payment of that firm.  We can see in Figure 7A 
that dividend announcements that we have categorized as being “neutral” (or 
having no news) have a share price reaction very near zero and have had such a 
reaction for the entire period of the sample.  On the other hand, dividend 
announcements classified as being “good” (beating the level of the previous 
dividend payment) have had consistently positive share price reactions.  
Furthermore, as expected, dividend announcements classified as being “bad” 
(less than the previous dividend payment) have largely had negative share 
price reactions. 
The pertinent issue, however, is not whether the market reacts 
positively or negatively to dividend announcements, but rather it is how 
change in share price reactions to news has altered over time. Figure 7A shows 
that the positive share price reaction to “good” news is less strong (in absolute 
magnitude) than it once was.  Similarly, the share price reaction to “bad” news 
is less negative than it once was.  
                                                 
52
 All specifications reported in this paper are using “value-weighted” market returns.  We 
have also re-computed the analysis using “equally-weighted” market returns.  There are no 
substantial changes in the results depending on which of these we use. 
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Figures 7B and 7C investigate this issue more closely by considering 
only the largest 20% of firms in CRSP and the smallest 20% of firms in CRSP.  
Delineating firms in this capacity allows us to see that  the share price reaction 
to dividend announcements in the very largest firms has been closer to zero 
over time and has declined less dramatically (toward zero) than the share price 
reaction for firms in the bottom quintile based on firm size.  The logic behind 
this assertion is that the largest firms have always been closely monitored and 
analyzed.  Consequently, there is less “surprise” in dividend announcements 
for large firms.  On the other hand, smaller firms have not been as easy to 
follow until the proliferation of the internet.  It logically follows that the share 
price reactions to “good” news have become less positive for smaller firms and 
the share price reaction to “bad” news has become less negative for smaller 
firms.  The evidence in Figures 7B and 7C is consistent with these assertions. 
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Figure 7A. Share Price Reaction to Dividend Announcements: Mean 
Cumulative Excess Returns, 3 Day Window 
 
 
 
              
Notes: Data on dividend announcements are collected from the Center for 
Research in Security prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.  Dividend 
announcements were collected from eight categories of U.S. cash dividends: 
1232, 1242, 1248, 1252, 1258, 1272, 1278, and 1292.  Observations with 
missing announcement dates were dropped.  The cumulative excess returns 
were calculated by regressing the firm daily stock return, Rit, on the value-
weighted average market return, Rmt.  The regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is 
estimated around s = 0, the event date.  We compute abnormal returns as 
follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal returns are then 
calculated by adding up the returns for the three days around the 
announcement and then averaging over all firms within each year.   A dividend 
announcement is considered “bad” news if the firm’s announced cash dividend 
amount is less than the firm’s previous cash dividend payment.  It is 
considered “good” news if the announced cash dividend payment is more than 
the previous cash dividend payment.  A dividend payment is considered 
“neutral” if the announced cash dividend is equal to the previous cash dividend 
payment. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Good, Bad and Neutral Dividend Categories ((-1,+1)) 
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Figure 7B. Share Price Reaction to Bad Dividend Announcements: Mean 
Cumulative Excess Returns, 3 Day Window, Bottom versus Top Quintile 
Firms 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data on dividend announcements are collected from the Center for 
Research in Security prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.  Dividend 
announcements were collected from eight categories of U.S. cash dividends: 
1232, 1242, 1248, 1252, 1258, 1272, 1278, and 1292.  Observations with 
missing announcement dates were dropped.  The cumulative excess returns 
were calculated by regressing the firm daily stock return, Rit, on the value-
weighted average market return, Rmt.  The regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is 
estimated around s = 0, the event date.  We compute abnormal returns as 
follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal returns are then 
calculated by adding up the returns for the three days around the 
announcement and then averaging over all firms within each year.   A dividend 
announcement is considered “bad” news if the firm’s announced cash dividend 
amount is less than the firm’s previous cash dividend payment.  
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Figure 7C. Share Price Reaction to Good Dividend Announcements: Mean 
Cumulative Excess Returns, 3 Day Window, Bottom versus Top Quintile 
Firms 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data on dividend announcements are collected from the Center for 
Research in Security prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.  Dividend 
announcements were collected from eight categories of U.S. cash dividends: 
1232, 1242, 1248, 1252, 1258, 1272, 1278, and 1292.  Observations with 
missing announcement dates were dropped.  The cumulative excess returns 
were calculated by regressing the firm daily stock return, Rit, on the value-
weighted average market return, Rmt.  The regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is 
estimated around s = 0, the event date.  We compute abnormal returns as 
follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal returns are then 
calculated by adding up the returns for the three days around the 
announcement and then averaging over all firms within each year. It is 
considered “good” news if the announced cash dividend payment is more than 
the previous cash dividend payment.   
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Figure 7D. Share Price Reaction to Neutral Dividend Announcements: Mean 
Cumulative Excess Returns, 3 Day Window, Firms in the Top Quintile by 
Firm Size 
 
 
 
Notes: Data on dividend announcements are collected from the Center for 
Research in Security prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.  Dividend 
announcements were collected from eight categories of U.S. cash dividends: 
1232, 1242, 1248, 1252, 1258, 1272, 1278, and 1292.  Observations with 
missing announcement dates were dropped.  The cumulative excess returns 
were calculated by regressing the firm daily stock return, Rit, on the value-
weighted average market return, Rmt.  The regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is 
estimated around s = 0, the event date.  We compute abnormal returns as 
follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal returns are then 
calculated by adding up the returns for the three days around the 
announcement and then averaging over all firms within each year. A dividend 
payment is considered “neutral” if the announced cash dividend is equal to the 
previous cash dividend payment. 
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Figure 7E. Share Price Reaction to Dividend Announcements: Mean 
Cumulative Excess Returns, 3 Day Window, Firms in the Top Quintile by 
Firm Size 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data on dividend announcements are collected from the Center for 
Research in Security prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.  Dividend 
announcements were collected from eight categories of U.S. cash dividends: 
1232, 1242, 1248, 1252, 1258, 1272, 1278, and 1292.  Observations with 
missing announcement dates were dropped.  The cumulative excess returns 
were calculated by regressing the firm daily stock return, Rit, on the value-
weighted average market return, Rmt.  The regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is 
estimated around s = 0, the event date.  We compute abnormal returns as 
follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal returns are then 
calculated by adding up the returns for the three days around the 
announcement and then averaging over all firms within each year.   A dividend 
announcement is considered “bad” news if the firm’s announced cash dividend 
amount is less than the firm’s previous cash dividend payment.  It is 
considered “good” news if the announced cash dividend payment is more than 
the previous cash dividend payment.  A dividend payment is considered 
“neutral” if the announced cash dividend is equal to the previous cash dividend 
payment. 
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FIGURE 7F. Share Price Reaction to Dividend Announcements: Mean 
Cumulative Excess  
Returns, 3 Day Window, Firms in the Bottom Quintile by Firm Size 
 
 
 
Notes: Data on dividend announcements are collected from the Center for 
Research in Security prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.  Dividend 
announcements were collected from eight categories of U.S. cash dividends: 
1232, 1242, 1248, 1252, 1258, 1272, 1278, and 1292.  Observations with 
missing announcement dates were dropped.  The cumulative excess returns 
were calculated by regressing the firm daily stock return, Rit, on the value-
weighted average market return, Rmt.  The regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is 
estimated for a window around s = 0, the event date.  We compute abnormal 
returns as follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal returns are 
then calculated by adding up the returns for the three days around the 
announcement and then averaging over all firms within each year.   A dividend 
announcement is considered “bad” news if the firm’s announced cash dividend 
amount is less than the firm’s previous cash dividend payment.  It is 
considered “good” news if the announced cash dividend payment is more than 
the previous cash dividend payment.  A dividend payment is considered 
“neutral” if the announced cash dividend is equal to the previous cash dividend 
payment.  “Top 20” refers to the top 20 percent of firms in CRSP in a given 
year by market value.  “Bottom 20” refers to the bottom 20 percent of firms in 
CRSP in a given year by market value. 
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Split Result 
In analyzing split data, our focus is centered on the cumulative average excess 
return in response to stock splits over the period from 1970 – 2007. Splits are 
divided into size categories and then are examined to consider whether the 
share price reaction has tended toward zero over time.  Figure 8A displays the 
cumulative average excess returns to stock split announcements for each year 
from 1970 – 2007, inclusive, using the three-day event window (-1, 0, and +1).  
Although the share price reactions to stock split announcements are generally 
positive, there does not seem to be any clear trend toward zero over time.  This 
is inconsistent with the “news is less newsworthy” hypothesis. 
Figure 8B repeats this analysis on only a subset of the data.  In 
particular, this figure only considers very large and very small firms.  Firms in 
the top quintile “top 20” and firms in the bottom quintile “bottom 20” are 
compared.  As expected, on average, smaller firms have a universally larger 
share price reaction to stock split news than do larger firms.  This is for the 
same reasoning we discussed in the section on stock dividend announcements.  
(Information released on large firms is not as much of a surprise, on average, 
since these larger firms are more closely monitored.) Simultaneously, Figure 
8C does not provide evidence in favor of the “news is less newsworthy” 
hypothesis.  Here, it is evident that the share price reaction to stock split 
announcements for smaller firms has not tended toward zero (relative to that 
for large firms) over time.  
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Figure 8A. Share Price Reaction to Stock Split Announcements: Mean 
Cumulative Excess Returns, 3 Day Window 
 
 
 
Notes: Data on stock splits are collected from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. Our data include 24,479 
stock split announcements.  The cumulative excess returns were calculated by 
regressing the firm daily stock return, Rit, on the value-weighted average 
market return, Rmt.  The regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is estimated for a period 
where s = 0 is the event date.  We compute abnormal returns as follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal returns are then calculated by 
adding up the returns for the three days around the announcement and then 
averaging over all firms within each year.  “Facpr<0” refers to stock buybacks, 
“0<facpr<1” is for stock splits with split ratios less than 2:1, facpr=1 is for 2:1 
stock splits, and facpr>1 is for stock splits with split ration greater than 2:1.   
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Figure 8B. Share Price Reaction to Stock Split Announcements: Mean 
Cumulative Excess Returns, 3 Day Window, Includes only Firms in Top 
Quintile and Firms in Bottom Quintile by Firm Size 
 
 
 
Notes: Data on stock splits are collected from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. Our data include 24,479 
stock split announcements.  The cumulative excess returns were calculated by 
regressing the firm daily stock return, Rit, on the value-weighted average 
market return, Rmt.  The regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is estimated for a period 
where s = 0 is the event date.  We compute abnormal returns as follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal returns are then calculated by 
adding up the returns for the three days around the announcement and then 
averaging over all firms within each year.  “Facpr<0” refers to stock buybacks, 
“0<facpr<1” is for stock splits with split ratios less than 2:1, facpr=1 is for 2:1 
stock splits, and facpr>1 is for stock splits with split ration greater than 2:1.  
“Top 20” refers to the top 20 percent of firms in CRSP in a given year by 
market value.  “Bottom 20” refers to the bottom 20 percent of firms in CRSP 
in a given year by market value. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
HOW NEWSWORTHY ARE ANNOUNCEMENTS? 
What can be Inferred from the Distribution of Share Price Reactions About 
Newsworthiness? 
After examining the three day cumulative average excess returns to 
corporate news announcements, it is reasonable to consider more complicated 
aspects of the distribution of returns to corporate news.  For example, if we 
thought that corporate news was less newsworthy, then not only should the 
mean tend toward zero, but the variance should decline as well. (This is to say 
that the daily differences between opening and closing prices would decline in 
absolute value for any given firm regardless of whether the day under 
examination was an announcement day or not.) 
Figures 9A, 9B, and 9C summarize an investigation of the standard 
deviation of the three day cumulative excess returns by year for dividend 
announcements, earnings announcements, and stock split announcements 
(respectively).  It is clear in each of the cases of dividends and splits the 
variance is not declining over time.  This analysis may be employed for other 
measures of dispersion in the data (not reported in the figures).  This may be 
executed, for example, for the 90 – 10 percent differential or for the 75 – 25 
percent differential (inter-quartile range).53  These trends are similar to those 
reported in Figures 9A and 9C.  
                                                 
53
 E.g., in the dividend data, the 90 – 10 percent differential in roughly 8 to 10 percent and flat 
over time and the 75 – 25 percent differential is roughly 5 to percent and flat over the 37-year 
period.  For earnings announcements, the 90 – 10 percent differential is between 10 and 15 
percent from 1984 through 1996 and goes up to roughly 24 percent by 2000.  Similarly, the 75 
– 25 percent differential is between 5 and 6 percent from 1984 through 1996 and rises to over 
10 percent by 2000.  For stock splits, the 90 – 10 percent differential is on the order of 12 to 15 
percent from 1970 through 1998, with a slight decline over time and then goes up in the last 
few years to roughly 25 percent.  The 75 – 25 percent differential is roughly five to six percent 
from 1970 through 1998 with a slight decline over time and then rises in the last few years to 
about 10 percent.  
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An interesting trend emerges in the standard deviation of three day 
cumulative excess returns for earnings announcements (Figure 9B) inasmuch 
as there has been a rising (and then stabilizing) mean cumulative excess return 
in the 2000s.  A possible explanation to this phenomenon lies in the 
proliferation of financial engineering and coinciding mass volume movements 
in stock trades surrounding earnings announcement news. Another explanation 
for this trend centers around the increasing number of independent traders who 
operate apart from large banks and institutions. With more trading volume 
coming from a potentially “uninformed” constituency, the standard deviation 
of three day returns would hypothetically increase.54  
To further examine the entire distribution of the three day share price 
reaction, we plot kernel density estimates of the distribution of the three day 
returns for dividend announcements, earnings announcements, and stock split 
announcements (in Figures 10A, 10B, 10C respectively).  As in considering 
the estimates of the standard deviation above, the aim here is to investigate 
whether the distribution is less “spread out” (with, therefore, a higher central 
peak) in the later period.  This would be consistent with the “news is less 
newsworthy” hypothesis. 
There is no evidence for this in Figure 10, which plots the kernel 
density estimates for the distributions of dividend announcements for the 
1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s separately.  In fact, the distribution for the 
1990s seems to be to the right of that from the 1970s and to the left of the 
distribution from the 1980s.  The spread for the 1990s seems to similarly fall 
between that from the other two decades.  
                                                 
54
 This will be further discussed in the summary section (IX) 
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The earnings data are only available from 1984 – 2007 so we separate 
1984 – 1989; 1990 – 2000 and 2001 – 2007.  In 11A it is also not the case that 
the most recent group (the 1990s) is less spread out than the older (1980s) 
group.  In fact, the 1990s are much more spread out.  This is also true in 11B 
where the distribution of three day returns to stock split announcements is not 
less spread out in the most recent period.  Therefore, none of the kernel density 
estimates evidence supports the “news is less newsworthy” idea. 
 
Figure 9A. Standard Deviation of Three Day Returns for Dividend 
Announcements Over Time 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The cumulative excess returns were calculated by regressing the firm 
daily stock return, Rit, on the value-weighted average market return, Rmt.  The 
regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is estimated around the event date.  We compute 
abnormal returns as follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal 
returns are then calculated by adding up the returns for the three days around 
the announcement.  Rather than averaging the three days returns within year, 
these figures simply compute the standard deviations each year.   
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Figure 9B. Standard Deviation of Three Day Returns for Earnings 
Announcements Over Time 
 
 
Notes: The cumulative excess returns were calculated by regressing the firm 
daily stock return, Rit, on the value-weighted average market return, Rmt.  The 
regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is estimated around the event date.  We compute 
abnormal returns as follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal 
returns are then calculated by adding up the returns for the three days around 
the announcement.  Rather than averaging the three days returns within year, 
these figures simply compute the standard deviations each year.   
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Figure 9C. Standard Deviation of Three Day Returns for Split Announcements 
Over Time 
 
 
 
Notes: The cumulative excess returns were calculated by regressing the firm 
daily stock return, Rit, on the value-weighted average market return, Rmt.  The 
regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is estimated around the event date.  We compute 
abnormal returns as follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal 
returns are then calculated by adding up the returns for the three days around 
the announcement.  Rather than averaging the three days returns within year, 
these figures simply compute the standard deviations each year.   In figure 9C, 
we report information for all splits, for “0<facpr<1” (stock splits with split 
ration less than 2:1), and “facpr=1” (stock splits with split ration equal to 2:1”. 
Splits with a ratio greater than 2:1 are not reported since there are so few in the 
data. 
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Figure 10A. Distribution of Cumulative Excess Returns by Decade – Job Loss 
Announcement 
 
  
 
Source: Calculations by the author using announcement information from the 
Wall Street Journal and data stock price data from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). Note: there is not more probability mass between 0 
and 0.05 and thus there is little movement in control tendency reduction in the 
likelihood of negative cumulative excess returns. 
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Industry Controls on Announcement Type and Newsworthiness Impact 
To appropriately address potential explanations for differences in 
reactions to announcements (whether splits, dividends, earnings or layoffs over 
time), we must consider the impact industrial identity has on the variance in 
trading activity in any given firm.  This is to say that characteristics and trends 
that impact stock activity for any given firm or subset therein may be less 
reflective of firm performance and the consequential or coinciding stock 
activity, and more reflective of news and events impacting the broader industry 
to which it belongs. A major issue which arises here is consolidation within 
industries and the impact such consolidation has had on the market cap, asset 
size, and general performance of competitors.  When many firms compete in 
the same space, any news that impacts (positively or negatively) that given 
firm also indirectly impacts peer firms.  The direction of the impact on news 
from competing firms varies on a case-by-case basis, as the market does not 
function as a pure zero-sum game wherein any firm that “wins” necessarily 
makes other firms “lose”. As an example, positive news in the banking sector 
which reflects increased mandates for innovative new products which all banks 
may successfully produce may result in industry-wide good performance 
which analysts could not foresee if at the time of their forecast the mandates 
were not publicly known, while positive news just for Goldman Sachs (in the 
form of higher than predicted investment banking activity) may represent a lost 
sale to Morgan Stanley (which would impact a lower bottom-line earnings 
number. Although this is just a microcosmic example, as Figure 9B details, the 
convergence within two percentage points of the standard deviation of three 
day returns for all earnings announcements over time from 2000 to 2007 
suggests that the actual earnings announcements and the forecasted earnings, 
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whether worse than, better than or the same as analysts forecasts share 
magnitude of deviation from actual cumulative excess returns. Figure 9C 
similarly reflects this trend in increasing standard deviation from the 
cumulative excess returns from 2000 to 2007. 
Addressing Industry Issues in the Data 
While issues surrounding the size of firms are addressed in Figures 6,7 
and 8, there are outstanding questions in regards to (1) the industry in which 
firms are categorized by CRSP and (2) COMPUSTAT and the potential impact 
belonging to different industries may have on trading volatility over time. To 
address these issues, we turn to industry data by firm. 
COMPUSTAT compiles industry by both an industry classification 
code system which identifies a company’s main line of business as well as firm 
specific covariates which define firms according to their EPS (basic, diluted 
and from operations), Net Income and Cash/ Cash Equivalents. The industry-
specific code is based on the SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) code 
created by the U.S. Census Bureau. 55 There are 381 DNUM industry 
categories, although several separate industry categories may be aggregated 
into a larger umbrella, (e.g. Agriculture Production being inclusive of 
livestock, agricultural services, and farm production.) After sorting the data by 
market cap and company income vectors, the industries that emerge as the 
largest include: Financial Services, Pharma, Computer and Software, 
Telecommunications, Motor Vehicles, and Natural Resource Companies.  
                                                 
55
 The Census Bureau is replacing SIC codes with NAICS (North American Industry 
Classification System) codes. Further, Standard & Poor's and Morgan Stanley have developed 
GICS (Global Industry Classification System) codes. A company's industrial classification can 
change from time to time, but the DNUM in Compustat data files generally reflects only the 
current classification, not the history of a company's industry affiliations. 
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While intra-industry firm size may vary, on average, publicly traded 
competitors in each category have relatively similar market caps.56 Industry 
controls were added in for regressions (4) to (7) in Tables 2, 3 and 4.57  
As outlined in Table 2, summary statistics of regressions with a 
dependent variable of excess cumulative returns and controls for size 
percentile, decade, industry dummies, and dummies for positive, neutral and 
bad earnings show a discernable trend between firm size and excess returns.  
The estimated coefficient on firms in the 20-40 percentile (by size) is larger 
than the estimated coefficient on firms in the 40-60 percentile (-0.342 as 
compared to -0.213), and is reflected to the top quintile of firms in the sample  
by size.  (The baseline of comparison is firms belonging to the smallest 
quintile, and in absolute terms the incremental impact of a change in firm size 
on cumulative excess returns decreases as the firm size increases). Compared 
to the 1980s (omitted from decade category), the estimated coefficient on 
decade increased in absolute amount, but the reaction magnitude (in either 
direction, negative or positive) to good earnings announcements and bad 
earnings announcements did not decrease in magnitude over time, suggesting 
“news is still newsworthy.” Furthermore, an F-test of the hypothesis that the 
structure of the model is the same across the decades apart from a shift in the 
intercept cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level (p value = 0.325). 
Thus, the constrained model cannot be rejected against the unconstrained 
model shown in the different earnings types. 
                                                 
56
 Market caps may be determined from the data by multiplying the number of shares 
outstanding by the price of the stock in any given timeframe. 
57
 Please see Section VII for additional suggestions for utilizing industry data in future work. 
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As seen in Table 3, which details a similar process for dividends as was 
done for earnings, there is a trend in the cumulative excess returns and the size 
quintile data.  The estimated coefficient on firms in the 20-40 percentile (by 
size) is larger than the estimated coefficient on firms in the 40-60 percentile 
(0.145 as compared to 0.130), and is reflected to the top quintile of firms in the 
sample by size. Compared to the 1970s (omitted from decade category above), 
the estimated coefficient on decade decreased in absolute amount, as did the 
coefficients on good and bad dividend announcements, suggesting that less 
cumulative excess return can be explained by announcements over time, 
regardless of whether the news is positive or negative for corporate outlook. 
An F-test of the hypothesis that the structure of the model is the same across 
the decades apart from a shift in the intercept cannot be rejected at the 5%  
significance level (p value = 0.405). Thus, the constrained model cannot be 
rejected against the unconstrained model shown in the different dividend types. 
 Lastly, in Table 4, with considerations of split data by industry, size 
and year factors, the estimated coefficient on firms in the 20-40 percentile (by 
size) is larger than the estimated coefficient on firms in the 40-60 percentile 
(0.245 as compared to 0.210), and is reflected to the top quintile of firms in the 
sample by size.  The baseline of comparison is firms belonging to the smallest 
quintile, and in absolute terms the incremental impact of a change in firm size 
on cumulative excess returns decreases as the firm size increases). That said, 
the predicted trend of a declining coefficient on years from 1970 on the 
cumulative excess returns is not reflected in the data, suggesting that split 
announcements still have impacts on stock trading similar to otherwise novel 
news. The constrained model cannot be rejected against the unconstrained 
 61 
 
 
model shown in the different split types, as an F-test of the hypothesis that the 
structure of the model is the same across the decades apart from a shift in the 
intercept cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level (p value = 0.315).  
 
TABLE 1. Summary of Share Price Reactions to Corporate News: Mean 
Cumulative Excess Returns, 3 Day Window 
  
 Layoffs Dividends Splits Earnings 
     
  Good 
News 
Bad 
News 
 Good 
News 
Bad 
News 
Expected Overall Sign varies > 0 < 0 + > 0 < 0 
Estimated Overall Sign varies > 0 < 0 + > 0 < 0 
       
Expected Trend from Past 
to Present 
less (-) less (+) less (-
) 
smaller in abs. 
value 
less 
(+) 
less (-
) 
Estimated Trend from Past 
to Present 
less (-) less (+) less (-
) 
0 more 
(+) 
more 
(-) 
       
Expected |larger| effects for 
small firms 
yes yes yes                yes 
Estimated |larger| effects 
for small firms  
 
yes yes yes                  yes 
Expected |larger|  effect for 
smaller firms controlling 
for industry 
Estimated |larger| effect for 
smaller firms controlling 
for industry 
yes 
 
yes 
yes 
 
yes              
 
  
                       yes 
 
yes 
           
yes 
 
yes 
 
Note: This table summarizes some of the main results in the paper using the 
four different types of data: layoff announcement data, dividend announcement 
data, data on stock split announcements, and data on earnings announcements.  
Data on dividend announcements are collected from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.  Dividend 
announcements were collected from eight categories of U.S. cash dividends: 
1232, 1242, 1248, 1252, 1258, 1272, 1278, and 1292.  Observations with 
missing announcement dates were dropped.  A dividend announcement is 
considered “bad” news if the firm’s announced cash dividend amount is less 
than the firm’s previous cash dividend payment.  It is considered a “good” 
announcement if the announced cash dividend payment is more than the 
previous cash dividend payment.  A dividend payment is considered “neutral” 
if the announced cash dividend is equal to the previous cash dividend payment. 
Data on stock splits are collected from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. A stock split is coded by a “5” in 
the first of a four digit distribution code. Our data include 43,259 stock split 
announcements.   
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Earnings data are collected from the Institutional Brokers Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S).  These include information on announced earnings per share 
for every firm in the sample.  We have 454,430 observations on earnings 
announcements.  We were able to match the announcements with additional 
data in I/B/E/S on the most recent analyst forecast of earnings for each firm in 
question.  News is considered “good” if the actual announcement of earnings is 
higher than the most recent analyst forecast.  News is considered “neutral” if 
the actual announcement is exactly the same as the most recent analyst 
forecast.  News is considered “bad” if the most recent forecast is higher than 
the actual announcement.” Large firms” refers to the top 20 percent of firms in 
CRSP in a given year by market value.  “Small firms” refers to the bottom 20 
percent of firms in CRSP in a given year by market value. 
The cumulative excess returns were calculated by regressing the firm 
daily stock return, Rit, on the value-weighted average market return, Rmt.  The 
regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is estimated around the event date.  We compute 
abnormal returns as follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal 
returns are the sum of the returns for the three days around the announcement 
and then averaging over all firms within each year.    
It was expected that overall sign of the share price reaction to layoffs 
would vary (positive or negative) according to firm size and time of layoff. As 
Hallock and Mashayekhi (2006) similarly found, the data support this.   
According to the “news is no longer newsworthy” hypothesis, we 
expected to find a less negative reaction to layoff announcements over time. 
This was supported by the data.  For dividend announcements, a positive 
reaction to “good” news and a negative reaction to “bad” news was found.  We 
expected and found a less positive reaction over time to “good” dividend news 
and a less negative reaction to “bad” dividend news.  We expected to observe a 
positive reaction to stock splits. The data supports this predicted outcome.  
The anomaly to the data is in regards to splits and the trend in earnings 
announcements from past to present -- according to the “news is no longer 
newsworthy” hypothesis, we expected to see a smaller (in absolute value) 
reaction to the announcement of splits, but instead found no effect. We 
expected to find that the market reacted positively to “good” earnings news 
and negatively to “bad” earnings news.  The data support both propositions.  
We expected to find a less positive reaction to “good” earnings news over time 
(but found the opposite).  We also expected to find a less negative reaction to 
earnings news over time (but found the opposite). In the case of each of the 
four news types, we estimated larger (in absolute value) reactions to news from 
smaller firms, as expected. 
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Table II: Regression Analysis of Cumulative Excess Returns, 3-day Window: 
Earnings 
 
  All 
 
All 
 
All 
 
All 
 
All Good 
Earning
s 
Neutral 
Earning
s 
Bad 
Earning
s 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4.5) (5) (6) (7)   
        
20-40 -0.342 
(0.103
) 
 -0.245 
(0.019) 
-0.233 
(0.008) 
 0.221 
(0.020) 
-0.189 
(0.009) 
-0.199 
(0.015) 
40-60 -0.213 
(0.098
) 
 -0.203 
(0.013) 
-0.190 
(0.009) 
 0.182 
(0.011) 
-0.099 
(0.010) 
-0.098 
(0.012) 
60-80 -0.101 
(0.076
) 
 -0.197 
(0.011) 
-0.181 
(0.010) 
 0.086 
(0.002) 
-0.073 
(0.009) 
0.055 
(0.007) 
80-100 -0.099 
(0.022
) 
 -0.076 
(0.009) 
-0.055 
(0.004) 
 0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.017 
(0.007) 
-0.011 
(0.010) 
Size 
Quin-
tile 
         
1990s ------ -0.009 
(0.021) 
-0.011 
(0.015) 
-------- ------- ------- ------ ------ 
2000s ------ -0.016 
(0.091) 
-0.082 
(0.012) 
-------- ------- ------- ------ ------ 
Dec- 
ade 
Each Year     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant -0.011 
(0.033
) 
-0.005 
(0.017) 
0.016 
(0.002) 
0.022 
(0.00554
) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
R^2 0.005 0.008 0.013 0.015 0.011 0.014 0.012 0.016 
N 454,43
0 
 
454,43
0 
454,43
0 
454,430 454,43
0 
190,861 1,690 261,879 
 
p-value 
Decade=0 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 p-value 
Size=0 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Note:  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Observations are weighted 
by the inverse of the standard error of the cumulative excess return.  The base 
category consists of the return for the smallest quintile of companies as 
delineated by market cap and the cumulative excess returns in the 1980s as we 
are interested in seeing the impact of time on cumulative excess returns. 
Changing the measure of company size as delineated by consideration of cash 
and cash equivalents, inventories, and short-term investments does not have a 
notable effect on firms in each size quintile. Industry parameters are specified 
by identifiers in Compustat.  (Multiple companies may be described by the 
same code.) 
   
There is a discernable trend reflected in the cumulative excess returns and the 
size quintile data.  The estimated coefficient on firms in the 20-40 percentile 
(by size) is larger than the estimated coefficient on firms in the 40-60 
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percentile (-0.342 as compared to -0.213), and is reflected to the top quintile of 
firms in the sample by size.  (Note that the baseline of comparison is firms 
belonging to the smallest quintile, and in absolute terms the incremental impact 
of a change in firm size on cumulative excess returns decreases as the firm size 
increases). Compared to the 1980s (omitted from decade category above), the 
estimated coefficient on decade increased in absolute amount, but the reaction 
magnitude (in either direction of negative or positive) to good earnings 
announcements and bad earnings announcements did not decrease in 
magnitude over time, suggesting “news is still newsworthy.” 
An F-test of the hypothesis that the structure of the model is the same across 
the decades apart from a shift in the intercept cannot be rejected at the 5% 
significance level (p value = 0.325). Thus, the constrained model cannot be 
rejected against the unconstrained model shown in the different earnings types. 
 
Regression equations, where dependent variable is cumulative excess returns: 
(1) Size percentile  
(2) Decade 
(3) Size percentile, decade  
(4) Size percentile, decade, and dummy for each year 
(5) Size percentile, decade, dummy for each year if earnings were good  
(6)  Size percentile, decade, dummy for each year if earnings were neutral  
(7) Size percentile, decade, dummy for each year if earnings were bad  
The industry controls are applied to equations (5) (6) and (7) 
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Table III: Regression Analysis of Cumulative Excess Returns, 3-day Window: 
Dividends 
 
  All 
 
All 
 
All 
 
All 
 
All  Good 
Dividends 
Neutral 
Dividends 
Bad 
Divide
nds 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
20-40 0.145 
(0.023) 
 0.132 
(0.024) 
0.103 
(0.017) 
0.092 
(0.021) 
0.099  
(0.035) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
40-60 0.130 
(0.010) 
 0.114 
(0.015) 
-0.101 
(0.019) 
0.098 
(0.020) 
0.082  
(0.022)  
-0.033  
(0.013) 
-0.021 
(0.011) 
60-80 0.101 
(0.009) 
 0.098 
(0.010) 
0.087 
(0.012) 
0.040 
(0.025) 
0.069 
(0.009) 
0.029 
(0.021) 
-0.032 
(0.012) 
80-100 0.008 
(0.002) 
 0.006 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.001) 
0.011 
(0.002) 
0.011  
(0.001) 
0.002  
(0.001) 
-0.103 
(0.090) 
Size 
Quintile 
 
         
1980s ------ -0.101 
(0.009) 
-0.099 
(0.010) 
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
1990s ------ -0.018 
(0.001) 
0.012 
(0.006) 
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
2000s ----- -0.016 
(0.002) 
-0.011 
(0.004) 
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
Decades 
Each 
Year 
   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.158 
(0.013) 
-0.021 
(0.011) 
-0.098 
(0.015) 
-0.072 
(0.008) 
-0.024 
(0.021) 
-0.054  
(0.019) 
-0.032  
(0.009) 
-0.073  
(0.010) 
R^2 0.004 0.007 0.012 0.015 0.020 0.024 0.024 0.024 
N 297,554 297,554 297,554 297,554 297,554 31,305 238,042 28,207 
p-value 
size 
quintile 
=0  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 
 
p-value 
decade 
=0 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
          
 
Note:  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Observations are weighted 
by the inverse of the standard error of the cumulative excess return.  The base 
category consists of the return for the smallest quintile of companies as 
delineated by market cap and the cumulative excess returns in the 1970s as we 
are interested in seeing the impact of time on cumulative excess returns. 
Changing the measure of company size as delineated by consideration of cash 
and cash equivalents, inventories, and short-term investments does not have a 
notable effect on firms in each size quintile. Industry parameters are specified 
by identifiers in Compustat.  (Multiple companies may be described by the 
same code.) 
   
There is a discernable trend reflected in the cumulative excess returns and the 
size quintile data.  The estimated coefficient on firms in the 20-40 percentile 
(by size) is larger than the estimated coefficient on firms in the 40-60 
percentile (0.145 as compared to 0.130), and is reflected to the top quintile of 
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firms in the sample by size. Compared to the 1970s (omitted from decade 
category above), the estimated coefficient on decade decreased in absolute 
amount, as did the coefficients on good and bad dividend announcements, 
suggesting that less cumulative excess return can be explained by 
announcements over time, regardless of whether the news is positive or 
negative for corporate outlook. 
 
An F-test of the hypothesis that the structure of the model is the same across 
the decades apart from a shift in the intercept cannot be rejected at the 5% 
significance level (p value = 0.405). Thus, the constrained model cannot be 
rejected against the unconstrained model shown in the different dividend types. 
 
Regression equations, where dependent variable is cumulative excess returns: 
(1) Size percentile  
(2) Decade 
(3) Size percentile, decade  
(4) Size percentile, decade, and dummy for each year 
(5) Size percentile, decade, dummy for each year if dividend 
announcements were good  
(6)  Size percentile, decade, dummy for each year if dividend 
announcements were neutral  
(7) Size percentile, decade, dummy for each year if earning announcements 
were bad  
The industry controls are applied to equations (5) (6) and (7) 
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Table IV: Regression Analysis of Cumulative Excess Returns, 3-day Window: 
Splits 
 
  All All  All All All Less 
than 
2:1 
2 :1 More 
than 
2:1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
20-40 0.245 
(0.014) 
 0.150 
(0.021) 
0.111 
(0.014) 
0.078 
(0.017) 
0.125 
(0.011) 
0.098  
(0.021) 
0.760  
(0.021) 
40-60 0.210 
(0.012) 
 0.124 
(0.013) 
0.104 
(0.020) 
0.098 
(0.020) 
0.121 
 
(0.009) 
0.022 
(0.032) 
0.110  
(0.018) 
60-80 0.155 
(0.009) 
 0.099 
(0.012) 
0.087 
(0.009) 
0.090 
(0.021) 
0.216  
(0.007) 
0.023  
(0.024) 
0.198  
(0.003) 
Size 
Quintile 
80-100 0.098 
(0.011) 
 0.005 
(0.002) 
0.033 
(0.009) 
0.041 
(0.002) 
0.310 
(0.010) 
0.099  
(0.021) 
0.100 
(0.016) 
1980s  -0.102 
(0.011) 
0.089 
(0.018) 
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
1990s  -0.015 
(0.009) 
0.020 
(0.010) 
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
2000s  0.236 
(0.032) 
0.312 
(0.012) 
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
Decades 
Each 
Year 
   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Industry     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
 Constant -0.223 
(0.055) 
-0.232 
(0.041) 
-0.145 
(0.032) 
-0.124 
(0.021) 
-0.205 
(0.014) 
0.250 
(0.022) 
-0.122 
(0.005) 
-0.099 
(0.012) 
 R^2 0.005 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.020 0.022 0.024 
 N 43,259 43,259 43,259 43,259 43,259 28,706 10,168 4,385 
 p-value 
size 
quintile 
=0  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 p-value 
decade 
=0 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Note:  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Observations are weighted 
by the inverse of the standard error of the cumulative excess return.  The base 
category consists of the return for the smallest quintile of companies as 
delineated by market cap and the cumulative excess returns in the 1970s as we 
are interested in seeing the impact of time on cumulative excess returns. 
Changing the measure of company size as delineated by consideration of cash 
and cash equivalents, inventories, and short-term investments does not have a 
notable effect on firms in each size quintile. Industry parameters are specified 
by identifiers in Compustat.  (Multiple companies may be described by the 
same code.) Noteworthy is the fact that the relationship between the issuance 
of a “more than 2:1” split correlates with a larger (positive) impact on 
cumulative excess returns than larger firms correlate with cumulative excess 
returns otherwise. This is largely explained by the signaling nature of splits in 
representing internal growth and access to additional streams of capital.  As 
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smaller companies tend to have less total shares outstanding, the impact of 
multiplying the number of shares outstanding in absolute number is of much 
greater consequence than it would be on a larger firm.  
   
There is a discernable trend reflected in the cumulative excess returns and the 
size quintile data.  The estimated coefficient on firms in the 20-40 percentile 
(by size) is larger than the estimated coefficient on firms in the 40-60 
percentile (0.245 as compared to 0.210), and is reflected to the top quintile of 
firms in the sample by size.  (Note that the baseline of comparison is firms 
belonging to the smallest quintile, and in absolute terms the incremental impact 
of a change in firm size on cumulative excess returns decreases as the firm size 
increases). That said, the predicted trend of a declining coefficient on years 
from 1970 on the cumulative excess returns is not reflected in the data, 
suggesting that split announcements still have impacts on stock trading similar 
to otherwise novel news. 
 
An F-test of the hypothesis that the structure of the model is the same across 
the decades apart from a shift in the intercept cannot be rejected at the 5% 
significance level (p value = 0.315). Thus, the constrained model cannot be 
rejected against the unconstrained model shown in the different split types. 
 
Regression equations, where dependent variable is cumulative excess returns: 
(1) Size percentile  
(2) Decade 
(3) Size percentile, decade  
(4) Size percentile, decade, and dummy for each year 
(5) Size percentile, decade, dummy for each year if split announcements 
were less than 2:1  
(6)  Size percentile, decade, dummy for each year if split announcements 
were 2:1 
(7) Size percentile, decade, dummy for each year if split announcements 
were more than 2:1  
The industry controls are applied to equations (5) (6) and (7) 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUDING COMMENTS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FUTURE WORK 
 
In summary, this paper describes the share price reaction to dividend, 
earnings, and stock split announcements over a 38 year period. It first 
considers whether there is differential information content in similar corporate 
news announcements for different types of firms.   Next, it investigates 
whether the value of news information about these firms has declined over 
time (addressing the question of whether news has become “less 
newsworthy”).  Assuming that news announcements are not homogenous and 
rather vary by industry and firm size, we expect the market to react less 
strongly (in absolute value) to new information from large firms. We find 
strong support for this hypothesis.  We find little evidence that is consistent 
with the idea that “news is less newsworthy” over the past few decades.  
However, we do find that the share price reaction to “good” dividend news has 
become less positive and to “bad” dividend news has become less negative 
over time. Interestingly, the standard deviation of excess cumulative returns 
around a three day window of earnings announcements have trended upwards 
(with convergence between good, bad and neutral announcements), suggesting 
that investors may be misinterpreting corporate signals of earnings capacity, 
investors are paying less attention to analyst forecasts, or the quality of 
information has decreased as more “noise” exists through media reports of 
corporate events. Regardless of this trend, additional investigation of entire 
distributions of returns using kernel density estimators rejects the “news is no 
longer newsworthy” idea. 
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There are several areas of research this piece lays a foundation for – 
some posing larger questions than others. On the issue of announcement types 
(particularly earnings and dividends), it would be worthwhile to calibrate the 
percent of analysts58 who predict earnings to be strong or dividends to be 
increased to determine if there is a substantive impact of predicted outcomes 
on actual trading volume and market equilibration around stock price.  As 
noted in Section IV C, there is no pre-existing rationale to predict that the 
announcement of dividends should get stock prices to respond either positively 
or negatively, but it is nonetheless worth exploring the issue of positive 
trending in announcements of dividends and increases in earnings 
announcements and its impact on trading volume.  With information on 
industry-specific factors that discrepantly impact some firms more than others, 
this topic may shed light on the relative differences in abnormal returns 
amongst publicly traded U.S. firms. 
 Next, an issue of inter-industry announcement impact should be more 
carefully considered. Even peripheral companies in different industries’ 
performance influence the outcomes of other firms.  For example, if Disney 
releases positive earnings results due to a well-performing movie, Time 
Warner stock may rally.  However, if Disney’s earnings come out stronger 
than forecasted because of a good season for the theme park, Time Warner’s 
stock is not likely to be impacted at all.  Thus, the implications of inter-
industry announcements may have sizeable effects on other firms, but such 
instances must be examined on a case-by-case basis to fully calibrate 
individual firm effects.  We attempt to address such inter-industry differences 
                                                 
58
 With the appropriate weight for the reputation of the firm of interest (e.g. Goldman Sachs 
having more weight than Jefferies) 
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by employing the classification codes delineated by Compustat and CRSP, but 
more may be done on this front by examining individual cases of related 
company announcements.59 
 Furthermore, although there is little doubt that companies act in ways 
to strategically maximize economic outcomes, the way in which they seek to 
manipulate perception of value has changed over the decades. Take, for 
example, the sizable increase in the number of splits employed by U.S. firms at 
the tail of the economic boom from 2002 to 2006 (see Figure 4).  While the 
rationale of employing this tactic to generate perception of firm value has been 
debated by academics and practitioners, it brings to light other tactics, like 
spin-offs, used to: (1) increase core parent-company performance by the 
divestiture of under-performing subsidiaries (thus improving the company’s 
entire balance sheet) or (2) to bring to public attention the stand-alone value of 
the subsidiary of interest.  As spin-offs are coded in CRSP since the late 1970s, 
including announcements of spins under a similar methodology to that 
employed in this paper is a logical progression of the work.60     
 Aside from the breadth industry-specific issues, there are political and 
legislative considerations that may change the standards of quality in 
information content upon which the public predicates investing decisions. This 
                                                 
59
 Similar to the methodology employed by Hallock and Farber (2009) in collecting Wall 
Street Journal information on a particular layoff, future researchers can detail the underlying 
reasons as explained by the 10Q to identify underlying drivers of performance to address this 
inter-industry issue. 
60
 Tactical spin-offs also pose an interesting question of investor sophistication, as 
dissemination of information may be complete through internet access and streamlined news-
feeds, but truly understanding the implications of a spin requires more complete knowledge of 
corporate performance at both the parent and operating company level (the financials for 
which are more complicated and extensive than they are for a vanilla, traditional company.  
Capitalizing on strategic spins may help indicate where trading volume is originating in the 
data under examination-- helping to address whether it is simply the movements of capital 
mandated by large institutional investors and pension funds or individual hedge funds and 
smaller-cap investors causing movements in stock price.  
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has considerable implications on the value of analyst forecasts, the 
transparency and correlation of non-event-specific press releases (regular 8K 
statements and general news coverage updates unrelated to earnings, dividend 
or split announcements) and an accurate reflection of the financial state of any 
given company.   This issue of increasing importance in the U.S. under 
Obama’s administration.  In March of 2009 the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and 
the United States Treasury Department announced the implementation of the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) program, which was designed to (1) 
provide liquidity on the balance sheets of financial institutions holding "toxic 
assets" from debt obligations that were on the balance sheets of financial 
institutions61; (2) allow the U.S. Department of the Treasury to purchase or  
insure up to $700 billion of troubled assets, including residential commercial 
mortgages and securities, obligations, or other instruments related to mortgages 
issued before March of 2008; and (3) permit the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York to lend up to $1 trillion on a non-recourse basis to holders of certain 
AAA-rated ABS backed by newly and recently originated consumer and small 
business loans.62 The details of the TARP program are not nearly as important 
as the underlying precedent of a newly invigorated “watchdog” overseeing the 
market.63  If the direction and momentum of this administration persists, 
initiatives to improve the availability and quality of information are not far-
fetched, and may provide for an interesting exogenous event which influences 
excess returns for each event type of interest.   Arguably of even greater 
                                                 
61
 This is done specifically through the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP). 
62
 This is done specifically through the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) 
program. 
63
 It is interesting to note that literature surrounding the impact of SOX legislation to increase 
the transparency of the financial state of companies found little impact on informativeness of 
announcements (Cohen, Dey and Lys (2005).  
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importance to studies of excess returns around news announcements is the 
verbiage in the TARP program around provisions providing the Chairman of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System the power to determine 
and advance peripheral issues influencing (or interfering with) market stability. 
Notably, credit ratings, which are integral to the calibration of earnings and 
dividend integrity, may be subject to substantial increases in oversight, as 
credit rating agencies have come under fire for inappropriately assigning high 
ratings to certain companies. Even if analyst consensus were to stay constant 
with the alterations in standards of credit rating quality, individual investors 
and smaller funds (which, as suggested in earlier portions of this paper are an 
increasing constituency in the totally invested assets in this country) may react 
to announcements differently or more promptly upon their release. In essence, 
if the economic state of financial institutions (and by commonly accepted 
practice, the rest of corporate America, irrespective of industry) are monitored 
and are consistently providing accurate information to the public, one would 
hypothesize that the magnitude of any “shock” is a less extreme deviation from 
normalized trading patterns.  
Taken together, to reduce the possibility of omitted variable effects on 
cumulative excess stock returns and to better detail stock activity around 
announcement times, future attention should be paid to dimensions like 
consolidation changes within industries, inter-industry impact of news 
announcements, and investor mandate origin.64 Furthermore, with an 
                                                 
64
 The last item may be addressed if private data is accessible to examine the movement of 
trades as they relate to investors who cannot hold funds which do not meet their organizational 
mandates (e.g. a large-cap investing pension or mutual fund which must sell if a stock hits a 
certain water mark, regardless of rationale for a corporate action like a divestiture via split-off, 
etc.) While the exact positions of smaller investors will most likely not be made public 
knowledge in the near future, larger stake holders, particularly when responsible for public 
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increasing number of investors seeking multiple forms of interaction and 
monitoring of their funds in the market (either actively by opening e-trading 
accounts and doing research on companies independent of analyst forecast, or 
passively by switching broker houses which cater portfolio solutions to 
personal preference), future research on excess returns around news events will 
be subject to an evolving “investor intelligence” landscape, where convergence 
of increasingly informative announcements and an increasingly well-connected 
investors may result in new patterns of excess cumulative returns around 
corporate news. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
pension funds and the like, are becoming more transparent to the public, and should serve as an 
invaluable data set in the near future. 
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Figure 11A. Distribution of Three Day Returns for Earnings Announcements 
Over Time, (-0.6,0.6),(-0.2, 0.2), (-0.1, 0.1) 
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Figure 11B. Distribution of Three Day Returns for Dividend Announcements 
Over Time  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dividends, Cumulative Excess Returns, -0.2 to 0.2 
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Figure 11B (Continued). Distribution of Three Day Returns for Dividend 
Announcements Over Time 
  
Dividends, Cumulative Excess Returns, -0.1 to 0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11B. Distribution of Three Day Returns for Dividend Announcements 
Over Time 
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Figure 11B (Continued). Distribution of Three Day Returns for Dividend 
Announcements Over Time 
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Figure 11C. Distribution of Three Day Returns for Split Announcements Over 
Time 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The cumulative excess returns were calculated by regressing the firm 
daily stock return, Rit, on the value-weighted average market return, Rmt.  The 
regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is estimated around the event date. We compute 
abnormal returns as follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal 
returns are then calculated by adding up the returns for the three days around 
the announcement.  Rather than averaging the three days returns within year, 
these figures compute kernel density estimates by the time periods indicated. 
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Figure 11C (Continued). Distribution of Three Day Returns for Split 
Announcements Over Time 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The cumulative excess returns were calculated by regressing the firm 
daily stock return, Rit, on the value-weighted average market return, Rmt.  The 
regression itmtiiit RR ηβα ++= is estimated around the event date. We compute 
abnormal returns as follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=  Three day cumulative abnormal 
returns are then calculated by adding up the returns for the three days around 
the announcement.  Rather than averaging the three days returns within year, 
these figures compute kernel density estimates by the time periods indicated. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 81 
 
 
 
Abarbanell and Bernard, July 1992, “Tests of Analysts’ Overreaction/ 
Underreaction to Earnings Information as an Explanation for 
Anomalous Stock Price Behavior,” The Journal of Finance, Volume 
XLVII, No. 3.  
 
Aharony, Joseph, and Amihud Dotan, 1994, “Regular Dividend 
Announcements and Future Unexpected Earnings: An Empirical 
Analysis,” The Financial Review, Vol. 29, No. 1, 125-151. 
 
Aharony, Joseph, and Itzhak Swary, 1980, “Quarterly Dividend and Earnings 
Announcements and Stockholders’ Returns: An Empirical Analysis,” 
The Journal of Finance, March, XXXV(1), 1-12. 
 
Arbel, Avner, and Gene Swanson, 1993, “The Role of Information in Stock 
Split Announcement Effects,” Quarterly Journal of Business and 
Economics, 32(2), 14-25. 
 
Ball, Ray, Kothari, S.P. “Security Returns Around Earnings Announcements”, 
The Accounting Review, Vol. 66, No. 4 October 1991 pp. 718-738. 
 
Brickley, James A., 1983, “Shareholder Wealth, Information Signalling and 
the Specially Designated Dividend: An Empirical Study,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, 12, 187-209. 
 
Brown, S. L., 1978, “Earnings Changes, Stock Prices, and Market Efficiency,” 
Journal of Finance, 33, 17-28. 
 
Brown, Stephen J., and Jerold B. Warner, 1985, “Using Daily Stock Returns: 
The Case of Event Studies,” Journal of Financial Economics, March, 
14(1), 3-31. 
 
Campbell, John Y., Andrew W. Lo, and A. Craig MacKinlay, 1997, The 
Econometrics of Financial Markets, Princeton University Press. 
 
Chambers, Anne, Penman, Stephen, “Timeliness of Reporting and the Stock 
Price Reaction to Earnings Announcements”, Journal of Accounting 
Research, Vol 22, No 1 Spring 1984 
 
Charest, Guy, 1978a, “Split Information, Stock Returns and Market Efficiency 
– I,” Journal of Financial Economics, 6, 265-96. 
 
Charest, Guy, 1978b, “Dividend Information, Stock Returns and Market 
Efficiency – II,” Journal of Financial Economics, 6, 297-330. 
 
 82 
 
 
Chan,  Wesley, “Stock price reaction to news and no-news: drift and reversal 
after headlines”, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 70, Issue 2, 
November 2003, pg 223-260 
 
Council of Economic Advisors, 2002, The Economic Report of the President, 
United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. 
 
Cohen, Daniel A., Dey, Aiyesha and Lys, Thomas Z.,Trends in Earnings 
Management and Informativeness of Earnings Announcements in the 
Pre- and Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods (February 1, 2005) 
 
Fama, Eugene F., Lawrence Fisher, Michael C. Jensen, and Richard Roll, 
1969, “The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information,” 
International Economic Review, February, 10(1), 1-21. 
 
Farber, Henry S., and Kevin F. Hallock, 2004, “The Changing Relationship 
Between Job Loss Announcements and Stock Prices: 1970 - 1999,” 
working paper. 
 
Foster, Taylor W. III, and Don Vickrey, 1978, “The Information Content of 
Stock Dividend Announcements,” The Accounting Review, April, 
LIII(2), 360-70. 
 
Fried, D., and D. Givoly, 1982, “Financial Analysts’ Forecast of Earnings: A 
Better Surrogate for Market Expectations,” Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 4, 85-108. 
 
Grinblatt, Mark S., Ronald W. Masulis, and Sheridan Titman, 1984, “The 
Valuation Effects of Stock Splits and Stock Dividends,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, 13, 461-90. 
 
Han, Ki C., and David Y. Suk, 1998, “Insider Ownership and Signals: 
Evidence from Stock Split Announcement Effects,” Financial Review, 
33(2), 1-18. 
 
Hallock, Kevin F., 2006, “Layoff in Large U.S. Firms from the Perspective of 
Senior Management,” forthcoming, Research in Personnel and Human 
Resources Management. 
 
Hong, Harrison, Lim, Terence, and Stein, Jeremy C. “Bad News Travels 
Slowly: Size, Analyst Coverage, and the Profitability of Momentum 
Strategies” The Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Feb., 2000), pp. 
265-295 
 
 83 
 
 
Ikenberry, David L., Graeme Rankine, and Earl K. Stice, 1996, “What Do 
Stock Splits Really Signal?” Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 31(3), September, 357-375. 
 
Ikenberry, David L., and Sundaresh Ramnath, 2002, “Underreaction to Self-
Selected News Events: The Case of Stock Splits,” The Review of 
Financial Studies, 15(2), 489-526. 
 
Kaestner, Robert, and Feng-Ying Liu, 1998, “New Evidence on the 
Information Content of Dividend Announcements,” The Quarterly 
Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 38, No. 2, 251-274. 
 
Kwan, Clarence C.Y., 1981, “Efficient Market Tests of the Informational 
Content of Dividend Announcements: Critique and Extension,” Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, XVI(2), 193-206. 
 
Krueger, Alan B., and Kenneth N. Forston, 2003, “Do Markets Respond More 
to More Reliable Labor Market Data?  A Test of Market Rationality,” 
Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(4), June, 931-957. 
 
Lakonishok, Josef, and Baruch Lev, 1987, “Stock Splits and Stock Dividends: 
Why, Who, and When,” The Journal of Finance, September, XLII(4), 
913-32. 
 
Lamoureux, Christopher G., and Percy Poon, 1987, “The Market Reaction to 
Stock Splits,” The Journal of Finance, December, XLII(5), 1347-70. 
 
Lundholm, Russell, and Linda A. Myers, 2002, “Bringing the Future Forward: 
The Effect of Disclosure on the Returns-Earnings Relation,” Journal of 
Accounting Research, 40(3), 809-839. 
 
MacKinlay, A. Craig, 1997, “Event Studies in Economics and Finance,” 
Journal of Economic Literature, March, 35(1), 13-39. 
 
McNichols, Maureen, and Ajay Dravid, 1990, “Stock Dividends, Stock Splits, 
and Signaling,” The Journal of Finance, July, XLV(3), 857-79. 
 
Morse, Dale (2002), Price and Trading Volume Reaction Surrounding 
Earnings Announcements: A Closer Examination, Journal of 
Accounting Research. 
 
Morse, Dale "Asymmetrical Information in Securities Markets and Trading 
Volume, “Journal of  Financial and Quantitative (December, 1980). 
 
 84 
 
 
Patell, Joames, Wolfson, Mark. Good News, Bad News, and the Intraday 
Timing of Corporate  Disclosures; The Accounting Review; Vol. LVII, 
No. 3, July 1982 
 
Pettit, R. Richardson, 1972, “Dividend Announcements, Security Performance, 
and Capital Market Efficiency,” The Journal of Finance, December, 
XXVII(5), 993-1007. 
 
Pearce, Douglas K, Roley, Vance.  “Stock Prices and Economic News”; 
Douglas K. Pearce and V. Vance Roley Source: The Journal of 
Business, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Jan., 1985), pp. 49-67 
 
Peterson, Millar, Rimbey The Economic Consequences of Accounting for 
Stock Splits and Large Stock Dividends; The Accounting Review, Vol. 
71, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), pp. 241-253 Published by: American 
Accounting Association 
 
Rendleman, Richard J., Jr., Charles P. Jones, and Henry A. Latane, 1982, 
“Empirical Anomalies Based on Unexpected Earnings and the 
Importance of Risk Adjustments,” Journal of Financial Economics, 10, 
269-87. 
 
Sloan, Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash Flows 
about Future Earnings? (Digest Summary) Accounting Review, Vol. 
71, No. 3: (1996)289-315 
 
Swaminathan, Lee; Price Momentum and Trading Volume; The Journal of 
Finance, Vol LV, No 5, Oct 2000 
 
Watts, R., 1978, “Systematic ‘Abnormal’ Returns After Quarterly Earnings 
Announcements,” Journal of Financial Economics, 6, 127-150. 
 
 
